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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues*
At the heart of this memorandum is the ultimate determination whether the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia can find the existence of genocide given the facts. The
underlying problem is that the black-letter definition of genocide in the Law on the Establishment
of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea1 does not clearly describe the crimes in
Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. The overarching issue is whether there is a barrier to satisfying
the definition of genocide—whether the legal description of the perpetration of large-scale deaths in
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge transcended mass killings to fulfil the crime of genocide, due to
barriers to liability posed by the elements of genocide, specifically, the requisite mental state of
“intent” to destroy a group “as such,” the identity of the groups in Cambodia relative to the
enumerated protected groups in the Extraordinary Chambers Statute, and the threshold number of
deaths necessary to constitute their destruction “in whole or in part”. Put another way, at issue are
the following questions:
•

What mental state must a perpetrator have for genocidal “intent”?

•

What is a protected “group”?

•

What groups were targeted for their existence “as such”?

*

The specific question posed by the Prosecution is: Discuss the applicability of the definition of Genocide
to the Cambodian factual situation, i.e., the definition of “group” and the complex matter of the mental
state necessary for liability.

1

Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution
of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001) (Cambodia) (unofficial
translation),
available
at
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR%20Law%20as%20promulgated%20(Eng%20trans%206%20S
ept%202001).pdf. (stating: “The acts of genocide […] mean any acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”).
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•

What level of destruction satisfies that group’s destruction “in whole or in part”?

•

What definitional interplay exists among the aforementioned terms?

The body and the conclusion of this memorandum will examine the definition of genocide
used in the ad hoc international tribunals and the International Criminal Court. The body then will
apply their jurisprudence on the definition of genocide the various interpretations of genocide under
the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute to the situation in Cambodia. Finally, this
memorandum will conclude that there are jurisprudential, academic, and policy-oriented arguments
for the finding of genocide in the Cambodian context.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. “Intent” to destroy does not necessitate that there be a mental state of
“purpose” (specific genocidal intent or dolus specialis) by the perpetrator, but
instead can mean a “knowledge” (though probably not “recklessness”)
standard by an actor or actors undertaking a genocidal plan.
It is obvious that the statutory “intent” in the Extraordinary Chambers Statute can speak to a
mental state of purpose.2 “Intent” and “purpose” by definition share the concept of a desired
outcome, which in this case is the specific intent to cause genocide, otherwise called the dolus specialis
in civil law. It is less obvious that genocidal “intent” can be fulfilled when a perpetrator merely has
knowledge that he is participating in a widespread plan of destruction of a group, when that group is
protected by the Genocide Convention. That interpretation of the Genocide Convention has been
held by the Krstić and Kayishema cases in the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the crime of
complicity in genocide.
This memorandum also advocates a recklessness theory of liability for genocide. The nexus
between “recklessness” and “intent” is at first unapparent. A recklessness standard, however, may fit

2

Greenawalt, Alexander K. A. Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based
Interpretation. 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259, 2268 (1999).
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the facts of the Cambodian situation, as there is reason to believe that intentionally evacuating cities
and forcing millions of urbanites onto agrarian communes was a policy that the Khmer Rouge knew,
or should have known, was likely to result quickly in widespread starvation and death. A recklessness
standard is admittedly a weak position, however, as there is no jurisprudence yet to support that
contention.3
2. The definition of genocide in recent jurisprudence not only protects the
clearly-enumerated “national, ethnical, racial or religious group[s]” but also
can protect groups whose membership is not fluid.
The clearly-enumerated groups that are protected against genocide are “national, ethnical,
racial, or religious” groups targeted “as such.” “As such” is a tricky phrase. It speaks to both the
actus reus and the mens rea. “As such” reaffirms the importance of the identity of the group being
destroyed as part of the act of the crime, and also affirms that the perpetrator worked specifically to
group for the sake of eliminating its identity.
The definition of a protected “group” is inherently subjective.4 A group exists insofar as its
members perceive themselves to be members, or the perpetrator perceives them to be members.
Some scholars argue that despite the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention shown in
the travaux préparatoires5 to favour only stable groups largely determined by birth6, courts should take

3

See generally Greenawalt, Alexander K. A. Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a KnowledgeBased Interpretation. 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259 (1999); see also Tournaye, Cécile. Genocidal Intent
Before the ICTY. 52 I.C.L.Q. 447, 450 (2003).

4

See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Trial Judgement, 6 December 1999, para. 56;
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Trial Judgement, 27 January 2000, para. 56; Prosecutor
v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Trial Judgement, 7 June 2001, para. 65.

5

See Summary Records of the meetings of the Sixth committee of the General Assembly, 21 September –
10 December 1948. [“travaux préparatoires” of the Genocide Convention].

6

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 1998, para. 511 (citing
the travaux préparatoires).
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an “ensemble” view of the protected groups7, not considering them one-by-one, but recognizing
them together as gestalt, where the concept as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and is
indicative of the underlying policy against killings targeted against groups rather than individuals.
Looking through the ensemble view, the principles of the Genocide Convention should be
construed to transcend the text and protect other, non-enumerated groups with a fluid membership,
such as political groups or socio-economic classes.
a) The groups that probably satisfy the genocidal requirement for destruction “as such”
include the Cham Muslims, the ethnic Vietnamese, Thai, and Chinese, and the Buddhist
leadership.
The facts in the Cambodian context probably satisfy the genocidal requirement for
destruction of the following groups “as such” under the Genocide Convention: the Cham Muslims,
the ethnic Vietnamese, the ethnic Thai, and the ethnic Chinese. Clearly, each group here is protected
as “national, ethnical, racial or religious”, or as combinations of those categories. In the Cambodian
context each of these groups fared particularly poorly under the Khmer Rouge.8
The Chinese are the least-clearly applicable racial or ethnical group who faced destruction
“as such.” Ethnic Chinese had been nearly all urban and were not targeted for execution because of
their race, but were targeted for work because they had been city-dwellers. Still, of the 1975
population of 430,000, only about 215,000 Chinese survived the Khmer Rouge. The Chinese
language, like all foreign and minority languages, was banned.9 Due to the fact that the Chinese are
clearly a protected ethnic and/or racial group under the Genocide Convention, and the Khmer
7

See generally Abrams, Jason. The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the
Codification of Genocide. 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303 (2000-2001).

8

See Abrams, Jason. The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of
Genocide. 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 306 (2000-2001).

9

See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND
HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 198-199.
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Rouge targeted them for especially hard labour in deplorable conditions that lead directly to their
deaths, there is still a strong case to be made for the commission of genocide against the Chinese
under any of various interpretations of the mental state requirement.
Less clear, but still probable, is that the destruction of the Buddhist leadership indeed
suffices for the genocidal requirement for destruction of as a religious group “as such” under the
Genocide Convention. The Khmer Rouge assaulted religious groups, especially Buddhists.10
Religious observances, rituals, and practices were prohibited. The monks were made to evacuate
their monasteries. The leadership and those who refused to disrobe or otherwise disobeyed orders
were executed. Prior to 1975, there were approximately 60,000 monks in Cambodia; by late 1979,
almost a year after the Khmer Rouge were ousted from Phnom Penh, fewer than 1,000 monks had
survived.11
b) The groups that less probably satisfy the genocidal requirement for destruction “as
such” include the educated and French-speaking socio-economic classes and political
prisoners from among the Khmer Rouge.
The Khmer Rouge members themselves who suffered politicide probably are not protected
by the Genocide Convention. At present, there has never been a finding of legal liability for
genocide based on the destruction of a political group, “as such.” Due to the fact that the words “as
such” were included in the Genocide Convention specifically to prevent the application of genocide

10

See Hannum, Hurst. International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence. 11 HUM.
RTS. Q. 82, 87 (1989) (quoting Y. Sam, Changes in Khmer Buddhists from 1954 to 1984, at 1 (Indochina
Project, Social Science Research Council, July 1985)).
11

See Hannum, Hurst. International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence. 11 HUM.
RTS. Q. 82, 87-88 (1989).
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to the extermination of political groups,12 any finding of liability for politicide as genocide will have
to arise out of an entirely new and expansive interpretation of Convention.
In their aversion to urban and foreign influences and non-agrarian labour, the Khmer Rouge
persecuted and often executed those with higher education. The death toll for the educated, urban
Khmer may have been 25%.13 Nevertheless, there is no legal precedent for the inclusion of a strictly
socio-economic class as a “group” in the definition of genocide. Like politicide, any finding of
liability for this matter will have to arise out of an entirely new and very progressive interpretation of
the enumerated “groups, as such” in the Genocide Convention based on an expansive view as a
matter of policy.
3. The level of destruction imposed on a protected group in order to satisfy
the “in whole or in part” requirement for genocide may not only be a certain
quantitative (numeric or proportional) threshold, but also may be a qualitative
threshold reached by the elimination of a group’s leadership or other
important members.
There are two ways to interpret “in whole or in part.” One such way is quantitatively, either
counting bodies to see if the number of dead reaches a certain threshold, or else looking at the
number of dead in proportion to the size of the targeted population as a whole. The quantitative
interpretation of “in whole or in part” has been used by the ICTR in the Bagilishema Trial
Judgement.14
The other view is qualitative, that the loss of certain members of a group, especially its
leaders or religious figures, can have such a disproportionate effect on the group’s function and/or
12

Kiernan, Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 202 (quoting personal correspondence with the above-named scholars).

13

Inference from deaths of urban Khmer in Table 1. This matter is explained in more detail in the section
on facts and the interpretation of Table 1, discussed below.

14

See Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Trial Judgement, 7 June 2001, para. 64.
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identity that that loss can constitute genocide. Jurisprudence in support of that view includes the
Sikirica Trial Decision and Jelisić Trial Judgements from the ICTY.15
Here, it is clear that the Khmer Rouge has eliminated groups “in whole or in part” both with
regards to the population of the group as a whole, and in certain cases also with regards to its
qualitative existence. The absolute numbers of deaths for the ethnic Thai, Vietnamese, Chinese, and
Cham are described below in Table 1. Only a perverse mind could conclude that any of those death
tolls does not constitute destruction “in whole or in part.” Additionally, as a qualitative matter, the
Buddhists suffered the losses of tens of thousands of their leaders, especially the Sangha monks16,
and the Cham Muslims suffered the loss of their hakkem leadership as well.17 Provided that the
existence of a protected “group” can be shown among those potentially-protected groups addressed
in this memorandum, this memorandum does not anticipate any significant barriers to a finding of
their destruction “in whole or in part” with regard to the actus reus.
4. To show the existence of genocide in the Cambodian context, the
Prosecution should consider advocating an expansive, largely policy-based
interpretation of the definition of genocide, arguing that purpose, knowledge
and recklessness may each fulfil the mental state requirement for genocidal
“intent”, that the protected “group” is inherently subjective and should be
construed under the ensemble view, and that the group’s destruction “in
whole or in part” should be assessed qualitatively.
The barriers to a finding of liability for genocide are as follows, in brief. Genocide will be to
be difficult to show in all the below-named scenarios applying the current interpretation of the

15

See Prosecutor v. Sikirica et. al., Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit, 3
September 2001, para. 66; see also Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10, Trial Judgement, 14
December 1999, para. 82
16

See Hannum, Hurst. International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence. 11 HUM.
RTS. Q. 82, 88 (1989).
17

See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 200.
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Genocide Convention. It will have to go beyond the clear but short-sighted interpretation of
purpose as the only mental state described by “intent” and arrive at a finding of knowledge or
recklessness as sufficient. To find liability for genocide against every group discussed herein, the
Extraordinary Chamber will have to adopt a new, expansive understanding of who can constitute a
“group” enumerated in the Genocide Convention. Furthermore, “as such” speaks not just to the
existence of a “group”, but to the mental state whence that “group” is violated, reaffirming that the
“group” has been attacked for the sake of its very existence. Finally, the matter of the threshold for the
destruction of a “group” “in whole or in part” must be addressed numerically, proportionally, and
quantitatively. It must also address the relationship between that phrase and the mental state, i.e.,
whether “intent” only to destroy “part” of a protected “group”—and no more—may constitute
genocide.
To overcome those obstacles, the Prosecution should argue on historical grounds that the
travaux préparatoires should be interpreted beyond their black-letter text. Instead, the travaux
préparatoires should be construed in light of the ultimate, fundamental intent of the Genocide
Convention, which codified the jus cogens against genocide as an overarching peremptory norm of
international law that stands above all other documents and instruments and seeks to preserve that
most basic human right of any people: the right to exist.
5. Ex post facto issues about the applicability of the contemporary definition
of genocide to events that took place from 1975-1979 probably will not be a
barrier to liability for genocide.
Finally, a brief but important matter is whether there are ex post facto barriers to the
Chambers arising from the application of a contemporary definition of genocide to the situation in
Cambodia from 1975-1979 instead of applying a definition of genocide that more clearly existed in
that period. One ex post facto problem is that arguably genocide was not a crime in Cambodia during

19

the period 1975-1979. Genocide was not clearly a crime in the Cambodia Penal Code of 1956,18
which was in force up until the time the Khmer Rouge came to power.
This memorandum concludes that the crime of genocide may be imposed on Cambodia by
international law if not by domestic law, even overriding the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
There are arguments that a prohibition against genocide was imposed by from international law via
the Genocide Convention, which Cambodia ratified in 1950.19 Moreover, despite ambiguities about
the application of human rights treaties under the Cambodia Constitution20, jurisprudence on
genocide and war crimes from the ad hoc Tribunals shows that those issues may be overcome to
uphold jus cogens.21 In order to uphold those fundamental principles of international law, the ad hoc
Tribunals have already set precedent for expanding the definition of war crimes and genocide in the
cases Stakić, Krstić, and Blagojević.22

18

See Cambodia Penal Code (1956).

19

See Hannum, Hurst. International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence. 11 HUM.
RTS. Q. 82, 123 (1989).
20

See Legal Loopholes Open for Ta Mok and Duch. PHNOM PENH POST. Issue 8/20. (1-14 Oct. 1999)
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/TXT/comments/legal.htm.

21

See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Advisory Opinion), [1951] ICJ Reports 16, at 23.

22

See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgement, 22 March 2006, para. 500; see also
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgement, 19 April 2004; see also Prosecutor v.
Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgement, 17 January 2005; see also Schabas, William. The
‘Odious Scourge’: Evolving Interpretations of the Crime of Genocide. paper presented to the Fourth Law
Congress
of
the
Ankara
Bar
Association
Conference,
(4-6
January
2006).
http://www.nuigalway.ie/human_rights/Docs/genocide.ankara.1.06.doc.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This memorandum recognizes that the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers are new, having
been promulgated by law in 2001, and staffed only in 2005-2006.23 As such, it is understood that
many specific factual matters are still under preliminary investigation. General facts regarding
genocide and mass deaths in Cambodia follow. For purposes of this memorandum, the facts are
assumed to be as they are presented here.
In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh. They had fought a protracted armed
conflict against the rule of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the Lon Nol regime which followed it.
Using a communistic framework, the Khmer Rouge sought as its core goal the creation of a pure
Khmer nation, self-reliant and free from the influence of perceived foreign and class enemies.
Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge undertook to achieve that core goal through a massive
reorganization of the country’s economic and social system, and through the persecution or physical
elimination of any part of Cambodian society regarded as incompatible with that vision.24
The Khmer Rouge was responsible for four categories of human rights abuses from 1975 to
1979:
A. Thousands of urbanites died in forced evacuations from the cities.
The first category of abuses involved the forced evacuation of the cities. The Khmer Rouge
evacuated all inhabitants from the cities at gunpoint, driving two to three million people into the
countryside within a week of its victory. According to one at least one investigation, patients in

23

See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001) (Cambodia)
[“Extraordinary Chambers Statute”], as amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (27 Oct., 2004) (unofficial
translation,
Council
of
Jurists),
available
at
www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR%20Law%20as%20amended%2027%20Oct%202004%20Eng.pdf.

24

See Abrams, Jason. The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of
Genocide. 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 303, 304 (2000-2001).
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hospitals in the middle of operations were forced to leave and died as a result; women in labour
were made to get up and walk and their new babies died in the heat; and a whole infant ward at the
Calmette Hospital was abandoned when the Khmer Rouge forced the staff to leave.25 The specific
goals of these evacuations were to dilute the power of those groups perceived as threats to the new
society and to perform communal agriculture. The Khmer Rouge leadership boasted over their radio
station that only one or two million people out of the population were needed to build the new
agrarian communist utopia; the others, ‘if they survive no gain, if they die, no loss.’26 As a direct
result, thousands of city-dwellers, especially the young, old, and weak, perished in the forced
marches into the countryside.27
B. Hundreds of thousands from the general population died performing forced
labour in agricultural communes.
The second category of abuses related to the conditions imposed on the population. The
Khmer Rouge organized the population into agricultural communes. In these early stages of the
Khmer Rouge’s power, hundreds of thousands died from starvation, disease, and exhaustion caused
by inadequate food and medicine and oppressive work. The Khmer Rouge overseers routinely killed
those unable or unwilling to work, sometimes along with their families. The regime also sought to
tear down traditional family structure by separating the children from the family.28
25

See Stanton, Gregory H. Blue Scarves and Yellow Stars: Classification and Symbolization in the
Cambodian Genocide (1987). http://www.genocidewatch.org/bluescarves.htm; see also Railsback,
Kathryn. A Genocide Convention Action Against The Khmer Rouge: Preventing A Resurgence Of The
Killing Fields. 5 CONN. J. INT’L L. 457, 461 (1989-1990) (citing Pomchaud, CAMBODIA: YEAR ZERO
(1977).
26

See Stanton, Gregory H. Blue Scarves and Yellow Stars: Classification and Symbolization in the
Cambodian Genocide (1987). http://www.genocidewatch.org/bluescarves.htm.

27

See Abrams, Abrams, Jason. The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the
Codification of Genocide. 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 305 (2000-2001).

28

See Abrams, Abrams, Jason. The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the
Codification of Genocide. 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 305 (2000-2001).
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C. The Khmer Rouge committed politicide against approximately twenty thousand
of its own former members.
The third category of abuses was committed against the Khmer Rouge’s own members. As
eminent scholar William Schabas at the University of Galway wrote, “resistance, and there was
apparently plenty of it, was met with terrible repression. This grew more frenzied as the venture’s
failure became increasingly apparent, and the regime became more threatened.”29 The result was that
when the Khmer Rouge had exhausted outside elements to oppose, it turned upon itself. According
to Jason Abrams, the Legal Officer in the United National Office of Legal Affairs in 2000, “the
Khmer Rouge’s rampant paranoia fuelled a continuing effort to search for and destroy perceived
enemies in its own ranks. Officers whose loyalty was suspect, as well as many of their families, were
killed in large numbers.”30 An alleged coup attempt in 1976 prompted purges aimed at all party
leaders, local officials, military officers, and citizens supposedly associated with the political
“opposition.” Khmer Rouge cadres recruited spies to identify dissidents and enemies of the state.
Children were encouraged to denounce their parents. Friends and family of the accused were
instantly guilty by association. Former Khmer Rouge cadres who were accused of sedition,
treachery, and collusion with Vietnam were taken to detention centres where they were tortured to
extract confessions. Archives from Tuol Sleng Prison indicate that 20,000 people there were
“smashed to bits” there.31 Only seven of the 20,000 who were interrogated survived when the

29

Schabas, William A. Cambodia: Was It Really Genocide? 23 HUM RTS. Q. 470, 473 (2001).

30

See Abrams, Abrams, Jason. The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the
Codification of Genocide. 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 306 (2000-2001).

31

See Hannum, Hurst. International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence. 11 HUM.
RTS. Q. 82, 90 (1989).
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Vietnamese occupied Phnom Penh in 1979,32 and 80% of those executed were Khmer Rouge
cadres.33
D. Widespread and systematic campaigns by the Khmer Rouge killed members of
incompatible political, ethnic, racial, and religious groups and the educated socioeconomic class.
The fourth category of abuses is particularly relevant for assessing genocidal “intent.” The
Khmer Rouge exterminated members of those groups it perceived to be incompatible with its vision
of a purely ethnic Cambodian nation. In a systematic campaign, the Khmer Rouge summarily
targeted teachers, students, and other educated people it regarded as being under the influence of
foreign elements.34 Most importantly for the assessment of genocide, the Khmer Rouge singled out
religious and ethnic groups.
Cambodia is and was an overwhelmingly Theravada Buddhist society. There were about
70,000 Buddhist monks in about 3,000 monasteries throughout the country in 1975.35 The Khmer
Rouge drove Buddhist priests and monks out of monasteries and onto the agricultural communes in
the countryside. Images of Buddha and other religious artefacts, statuary, books, and the monks’
libraries were destroyed. The Sangha leadership, the most venerated monks, were executed. Other

32

Hannum, Hurst. International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence. 11 HUM. RTS. Q.
82, 90 (1989) (“One of the last acts of the Democratic Kampuchea prison officials before fleeing in
January 1979 was to slit the throats of the prisoners then chained to their interrogation cots; when Tuol
Sleng was discovered, pools of blood were still coagulating beneath their bodies.”); see also Abrams,
Jason. The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of Genocide. 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 303, 306 (2000-2001).
33

Van Schaack, Beth. The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot.
106 YALE. L. J. 2259, 2271 (1997).

34

See Abrams, Jason. The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of
Genocide. 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 303, 305-306 (2000-2001).

35

See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 198.
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monks were defrocked36 and subjected to forced labour.37 One investigator, Ben Kiernan, found that
out of 2,680 Buddhist monks from eight of Cambodia’s monasteries he investigated, only 70 monks
were found to have survived in 1979.38

36

Railsback, supra note 25 at 463 (1989-1990) (citing Stanton, Kampuchean Genocide and the World
Court, 2 CONN. J. INT’L L. 341 (1987)).

37

See Abrams, Jason. The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of
Genocide. 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 306 (2000-2001).

38

See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 198.
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Table 1 Approximate Death Tolls [among ethnic/racial groups] under Pol Pot, 1975-197939

Several ethnic minorities faced discrimination, forced assimilation, and death. The significant
groups that the Khmers considered to be distinct from themselves either racially or physically were
the Thai, Chinese, Vietnamese and Cham.40 The largest ethnic minority groups in Cambodia before
1970 were the Vietnamese, the Chinese, and the Cham Muslim ethnic group. The Khmer Rouge’s
view of these and the country’s twenty other national minorities, who combined made up more than
39

See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 193.
40

See Hannum, Hurst. International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence. 11 HUM.
RTS. Q. 82, 86 note 7 (1989).
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15% of the Cambodian population, was virtually to deny their existence: the regime officially
proclaimed that they totalled only 1% of the population.41
Factual information regarding the ethnic Thai and their persecution is limited in this
memorandum. Several scholars note that the Thai suffered extraordinarily under the Khmer
Rouge.42 Scholar Kiernan, looking to the estimates from various studies, believes that almost half of
the 20,000 ethnic Thai perished under Pol Pot.43
The ethnic Vietnamese community was entirely eradicated. More than half of the 400,000
ethnic Vietnamese had already been expelled by the Lon Nol regime in 1970. Over 100,000 more
were driven out by the Khmer Rouge by 1976. The rest were killed.44
The sizable Cham Muslim minority suffered particularly poorly. The Khmer Rouge
instituted a policy of forced “Khmerization” that broke up Cham families, banned their language
and customs, and killed their leaders.45 One order from the Khmer Rouge stated that “[t]he Cham

41

See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 198 (citing Democratic Kampuchea Is Moving Forward, August 1977, at 6, which claimed a
Khmer majority of “99 percent”).
42

See generally Abrams, supra note 7; also see generally Hannum, supra note 10; also see generally
Kiernan, supra note 9; also see generally Railsback supra note 25.
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See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994) p. 199.
44

See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 198.
45

See Abrams, supra note 7 at 305-306; see also Hannum, supra note 10, at 86 (citing the Khmer
People’s National Liberation Front Bulletin No. 22, 25, April 1984 at 14).
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nation no longer exists on Kampuchean soil belonging to the Khmers.”46 When some Cham
protested and fought back against Khmer Rouge soldiers, many Cham villages were destroyed and
their inhabitants killed. Those Cham who were not killed were forbidden to speak their language,
and although they were Muslims, they were forced to eat pork.47 Over 100,000 Cham died out of a
pre-Khmer Rouge population of about 200,00048, or by another estimate 500,000 died out of
700,000.49 Of 113 hakkem, the Cham community leaders, only 20 survived in 1979.50
The Chinese under the Khmer Rouge lost, in absolute numbers, the most population of any
Cambodian ethnic or racial minority. Of the 1975 population of 430,000, only about 215,000
Chinese survived the Khmer Rouge by 1979. Unlike the Cham, the ethnic Chinese were not
necessarily targeted due to their ethnicity or race; rather, the ethnic Chinese had been nearly all
urban and as city-dwellers were made to work harder under the worst conditions. The Chinese
succumbed in particularly large numbers to hunger and to diseases such as malaria. The 50% of
them who perished is a higher proportion than that estimated for Cambodia’s former city-dwellers
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Stanton, Gregory H. Blue Scarves and Yellow Stars: Classification and Symbolization in the
Cambodian Genocide (1987). http://www.genocidewatch.org/bluescarves.htm (citing U.N. Doc.
A.34/569, at 9).
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See Stanton, Gregory H. Blue Scarves and Yellow Stars: Classification and Symbolization in the
Cambodian Genocide (1987). http://www.genocidewatch.org/bluescarves.htm.
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See Stanton, Gregory H. Blue Scarves and Yellow Stars: Classification and Symbolization in the
Cambodian Genocide (1987). http://www.genocidewatch.org/bluescarves.htm.
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See Hannum, Hurst. International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence. 11 HUM.
RTS. Q. 82, 87 (1989).
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See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 200.
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in general (about 33%). Further, the Chinese language, like all foreign and minority languages, was
banned.51
The educated class suffered as well. In the Khmer Rouge’s aversion to urban and foreign
influences and non-agrarian labour, it persecuted and often executed those with higher education
and specialized skills, summarily targeting teachers, students, and other educated people it regarded
as being under the influence of foreign elements.52 Slogans included “what is infected must be cut
out,” and “it isn’t enough to cut down a bad plant, it must be uprooted.”53 The Khmer Rouge
frequently killed the entire families of alleged transgressors.54
Finally, there was also a large-scale campaign by the Khmer Rouge against supposed
“political” elements. One of the most massive killings committed was against people in the Eastern
Zone that the Khmer Rouge leaders declared to have “Khmer bodies, but Vietnamese heads.”55 In
1978, in the provinces of Svay Rieng, Prey Veng and parts of Kandal and Kompong Cham near the
Vietnamese border, most people were evacuated to other provinces where they were placed in
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Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 198-199.
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communes, underfed and overworked to death.56 When the Eastern Zone was evacuated, every
person was given and required to wear a blue and white checked scarf by Khmer Rouge cadres from
Phnom Penh who were acting on direct orders from the Communist Party Central Committee.57 An
estimated minimum of 100,000 people were executed in a six-month period.58 While some of those
executed in the Eastern Zone belonged to a recognizable political group judged to be disloyal, far
larger numbers of people were killed because they were deemed to be tainted. The overwhelming
number of those massacred were actually peasants or urban evacuees without any particular political
affiliation.59

56

See Stanton, Gregory H. Blue Scarves and Yellow Stars: Classification and Symbolization in the
Cambodian Genocide (1987). http://www.genocidewatch.org/bluescarves.htm.
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III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. The Extraordinary Chambers Statute
1. Black letter law on the definition of genocide
The crime of genocide is defined as follows in the Extraordinary Chambers Statute60:
Article 4
The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all
Suspects who committed the crimes of genocide as defined in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 1948, and which were committed during the period
from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
The acts of genocide, which have no statute of limitations, mean any
acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:





killing members of the group;
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part;
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
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Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001) (Cambodia)
(unofficial
translation)
[“Extraordinary
Chambers
Statute”],
available
at
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR%20Law%20as%20promulgated%20(Eng%20trans%206%20S
ept%202001).pdf; see also Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001)
(Cambodia), as amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (27 Oct., 2004) (unofficial translation, Council of
Jurists),
available
at
www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR%20Law%20as%20amended%2027%20Oct%202004%20Eng.pdf
[emphasis added]. Note that there was at one point an academic controversy over the translation of the
Extraordinary Chambers Statute. The unofficial English translation of the 2004 amended Extraordinary
Chambers Statute transposed two words, making liability for destruction of groups “such as” rather than
groups “as such,” which was the wording in the original, unofficial 2001 English translation. See Wald,
Patricia M. Prosecuting Genocide, in JUSTICE INITIATIVES, 85, 553 note 33 (The Open Society Justice
Initiative, 2006) available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2?res_id=103182. The author of
this memorandum believes the phrase “such as” in the 2004 English translation is incorrect. First, “such
as” would be a radical departure from any other international instrument on genocide that the Cambodian
Statute draws from, all of which use “as such.” Second, unlike the English translation, the French
translation of Article 4 remained unchanged from 2001 to 2004.
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forcibly transferring children from one group to another
group.
The following acts shall be punishable under this Article:
 attempts to commit acts of genocide;
 conspiracy to commit acts of genocide;
 participation in acts of genocide.
That definition in the Extraordinary Chambers Statute comes almost verbatim from general
definitions in various other international law instruments. Indeed, the text of Article 9 of the
Cambodia Special Agreement61 authorizing the Extraordinary Chambers invokes such instruments:
Article 9
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers shall
be the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, crimes
against humanity as defined in the 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and such other crimes as defined in Chapter II of the
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers as
promulgated on 10 August 2001.
It is worth noting that Article 2(2) of the Cambodia Special Agreement with the United
Nations also subsumes Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties62, which
advocate a binding good faith interpretation and the supremacy of the Extraordinary Chambers
Statute, respectively. Cambodia is therefore obligated to look to each of the enumerated treaties as
an authority. The existing jurisprudence on them is formidable. A textual analysis of each treaty and
the most relevant jurisprudence on them follows.

61

Agreement Between The United Nations And The Royal Government Of Cambodia Concerning The
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law Of Crimes Committed During The Period Of Democratic
Kampuchea, 6 June 2003. [“Cambodia Special Agreement”].
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force 23 May
1969 Vienna Convention”] (stating that “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith” and “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty,” respectively).
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2. References to the Genocide Convention
The Extraordinary Chambers Statute and the Cambodia Special Agreement each invoke the
Genocide Convention.63 The black letter law of the Genocide Convention is identical to the
Extraordinary Chambers Statute in every substantive respect.64 It is Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention65, which is invoked generally in the Cambodia Special Agreement66, that helps in
analyzing the Genocide Convention. The Vienna Convention states that both the “ordinary
meaning” and the “object and purpose” of Genocide Convention should be used in its
interpretation. Therefore, the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention are under
Extraordinary Chambers’ consideration along with the black letter law. It is the framers’ intent as
expressed by the history of the Genocide Convention that best shows that object and purpose.
The object and purpose of the Genocide Convention and the rationale behind the
enumeration of each of the protected groups are described in, or can be gleaned from, a set of

63

The Cambodia Special Agreement:
Article 9: “The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Extraordinary
Chambers shall be the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide”; The Extraordinary Chambers Statute reads in Article 4: “The
Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all
Suspects who committed the crimes of genocide as defined in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of 1948”.
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Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, U.N.
Doc. 78 U.N.T.S. 277 entered into force 12 Jan. 1951. [“Genocide Convention”] (stating in Article 2 that
the enumerated types of protected “groups” are “national, ethnical, racial or religious groups,” “as such”).
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Vienna Convention.
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The Cambodia Special Agreement reads in Article 2(2) in relevant part: “The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, and in particular its Articles 26 and 27, applies to the Agreement.”
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preparatory documents called the travaux préparatoires.67 Those documents show that the prehistory
of the Genocide Convention consisted of a web of treaties that was developed to recognize the need
for special protections of national minorities following World War One68, especially among Eastern
Europeans and Armenians.69 Raphael Lemkin, the father of the term “genocide” and himself a
Polish-American, recognized the dangers arising out of the eradication of other cultures and peoples.
He went on to describe genocide in detail noting that “the objectives [of genocide are] disintegration
of the political and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the
economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health,
dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups,”70 demonstrating that he
understood genocide to constitute the loss of human life and also the culture that lives therein. If
Lemkin’s position on genocide is to be upheld, then a proper interpretation of the Genocide
Convention is that it was intended to protect groups targeted for destruction and also to protect
mankind as a whole, for without those constituent groups mankind would lose the richness of its
own cultural diversity.
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See Schabas, William. GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), p. 294; see also Alonzo-Maizlish, David. In Whole Or In Part: Group Rights, The Intent Element
Of Genocide, And The “Quantitative Criterion”. 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1369, 1379 note 42 (2002) (listing
post-First World War treaties throughout Europe that were titled “For the Protection of Minorities”).
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See Schabas, William. GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), pp. 16-24.
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See Alonzo-Maizlish, David. In Whole Or In Part: Group Rights, The Intent Element Of Genocide, And
The “Quantitative Criterion”. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1369, 1379 notes 42-44 (2002) (citing the long list of
protective treaties in Eastern Europe, and also the Armenian genocide).
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Alonzo-Maizlish, David. In Whole Or In Part: Group Rights, The Intent Element Of Genocide, And The
“Quantitative Criterion”. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1369, 1383 note 58 (2002) (quoting Lemkin).
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A careful reader should note that the travaux préparatoires are only persuasive authority71 and
that the apparently-singular purpose expressed for the Genocide Convention in the travaux
préparatoires actually differs with each drafting state. Consequently, one critical scholar from the
University of Helsinki, Jan Klabbers, has written that “The travaux préparatoires shall only be
consulted in a number of limited circumstances, in particular where application of the general rule
would lead to manifestly absurd or unreasonable results or where it would leave the meaning of the
treaty ambiguous or obscure. [...T]o dispel any doubt, resort to the travaux préparatoires is explicitly
referred to, in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, as a ‘supplementary’ means of interpretation.”72
Finally, due to the fact that the Extraordinary Chambers Statute and the Cambodia Special
Agreement each invoke the Genocide Convention, making its interpretation an issue, it stands to
reason that the Extraordinary Chambers Statute should invoke jurisprudence from peer courts that
have interpreted the Genocide Convention. The most relevant courts are the ad hoc Tribunals for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, who have dealt with ethnic conflicts, mass killings, and
genocide, and whose empowering statutes contain almost identical language relative to the Genocide
Convention.
3. Reference to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court73 is invoked as a source of law
on crimes against humanity in Article 9 of the Cambodia Special Agreement.74 It is not, however,
71

See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, 2 Aug. 2001, paras. 142, 584 (showing
that “the evidence in the Convention’s travaux préparatoires provide additional support.”) [emphasis
added]; see also Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgement, 22 March 2006, para. 501
(citing “the object and purpose of the Convention as reflected in the travaux préparatoires” as one of
several primary sources for the interpretation of genocide).
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Klabbers, Jan. International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of Travaux Préparatoires in
Treaty Interpretation? N.I.L.R. 267, 280 (2003)..
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force 1
July 2002. [“Rome Statute”].
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directly invoked as an authority the in the Extraordinary Chambers Statute of 200175 or as most
recently amended in 2004.76 The Rome Statute may be invoked implicitly, however, due to the fact
that it is subsumed under the articles of the 2004 Extraordinary Chambers Statute as a source of
authority on mutually-enumerated crimes such as crimes against humanity and genocide.77 The
relevant section of the Rome Statute, like the Extraordinary Chambers Statute, has most of the same
language as the Genocide Convention. Due to the fact that the International Criminal Court is new
and has not, at the time of this writing, tried any cases on genocide in Darfur or elsewhere, there is
as yet no new interpretation of the Extraordinary Chambers Statute to be gleaned from any ICC
jurisprudence as peer authority. It is worth noting, however, that the ICC will be trying the crimes of
Darfur concurrently with the Cambodia Extraordinary Chambers’ proceedings, and any of the ICC’s
findings regarding genocide will certainly have strong persuasive authority in the Cambodia
Extraordinary Chambers given the similarity of their statutes.
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Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to bring to trial all Suspects who committed any of these
crimes set forth in the 1956 Penal Code”, Article 4: “The Extraordinary Chambers shall have the power to
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Rome Statute, Article 5: “The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this
Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c)
War crimes […]”.
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B. Preliminary Matters
There are various matters about the definition of genocide that are generally agreed-upon
and not complex enough to warrant extensive discussion, but which this section will use as a
foundation for the complex discussion about the various interpretations of the Genocide
Convention.
1. Genocide does not require killing
One preliminary matter is dispelling the misconception that genocide requires killings. The
Akayesu Trial Chamber reminds us that the actual, physical destruction of all the members of a
group does not have to occur as a requirement for genocide. The Trial Chamber there stated that
“[c]ontrary to popular belief, the crime of genocide does not imply the actual extermination of the
group in its entirety.”78 For instance, Article 2(e) of the Genocide Convention recognizes that
separating a protected group’s children from their parents could “destroy” a group by making its
reproduction impossible, yet without killing anyone. The Chamber continued to explain the
importance of the mental element in committing genocidal acts: “[genocide] is understood as such
once any one of the acts mentioned in [Articles 2(a) through 2(e) of the Genocide Convention] is
committed with the specific intent to destroy ‘in whole or in part’ a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”79
That view shows that “destruction” is a process that itself is defined by the ultimate end that the
perpetrator intends to achieve.
2. No minimum number of deaths for liability for genocide
Another set of preliminary matters when there has been killing regards the minimum
numerical threshold of deaths necessary to constitute genocide and the related matter of when
78

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 1998, para 497.
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 1998, para 497 (citing
the same five genocidal acts in the ICTR Statute that are enumerated in Article 4 of the Extraordinary
Chambers Statute). [emphasis added].
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failure to reach even that minimal threshold should be considered attempted genocide. Though
there is no jurisprudence on a strict numerical minimum deaths for genocide, Daniel Nsereko of the
University of Botswana has argued that “as long as the perpetrator injures or kills [a person, even if
only one] with intent and in execution of a co-ordinated plan to destroy the rest of his victim’s
group or a substantial part of it, he is guilty of genocide or at least attempt to commit genocide.”80
Should the perpetrator fail actually to commit genocide as provided for in Article 2 of the genocide
Convention, the perpetrator may still be held liable for attempt.81
3. Genocide requires a plan carried out by a state
A final set of related preliminary matters is whether the involvement of the state and the
existence of a genocidal plan are required for genocide. Academic scholarship and jurisprudence
from the ad hoc Tribunals seemingly is unanimous on this determination. Otto Triffterer has written
that as a practical matter, “[The perpetration of genocide] needs a process, continuing for a while, to
achieve such a destruction,”82 implying that there must be a plan to carry out genocide over time.
William Schabas agrees, elaborating that not only must there be a plan, it must be implemented by a
state: “Because of the scope of the crime of genocide, it can hardly be committed by an individual,
acting alone. Indeed, while exceptions cannot be ruled out, it is virtually impossible to imagine
genocide that is not planned and organized either by the State itself or by some clique associated
with it. This is another way of saying that, for genocide to take place, there must be a plan, even though
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Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Genocide: A Crime Against Mankind, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW–THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
COURTS (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman, eds., 1999), p. 125.
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The Extraordinary Chambers Statute reads at the end of Article 4: “The following acts shall be
punishable under this Article: attempts to commit acts of genocide.”
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Otto Triffterer, Genocide, its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such, 14
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 400, 402 (2001).
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there is nothing in the Convention that explicitly requires this.”83 Thomas Simon, Professor of
Philosophy at Illinois State University, has stated his concurring opinion that there must be
genocidal plan undertaken by a state84:
[G]enocide has an underlying rationale, a rationale that situates itself
both in individuals and in bureaucratic structures that include statesponsored rules, edicts, and proclamations. Acts of genocide do not
occur randomly, accidentally, or indiscriminately. The perpetrator
identifies the targeted group in some way, however perverse,
generally through accompanying state structures, such as laws, and
then fully employs the state apparatus to eliminate members of the
group. It is critical to seek links between individuals involved in genocide and the
state.
Perhaps most importantly, the Kayishema & Ruzindana Trial Chamber has held that the very existence
of a plan was “strong evidence of the specific intent requirement.”85 The Trial Chamber explicitly
affirmed the positions expressed by international legal scholars Virginia Morris and Michael P.
Scharf of the UN Office of Legal Affairs and Frederick K. Cox Center at Case Western Reserve
University, respectively, stating that “it is virtually impossible for the crime of genocide to be
committed without some direct or indirect involvement on the part of the State given the magnitude
of this crime.”86
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Schabas, William. GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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Simon, Thomas W. Defining Genocide. 15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 243, 250 (1996-1997). [emphasis added].

85

Prosecutor v. Kayishima and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgement, 21 May 1999, para.
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Prosecutor v. Kayishima and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgement, 21 May 1999, para
94 (citing Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA 168 (1998)).
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C. “Intent”
The mental state requirement for genocide is a complex issue that requires a triple-pronged
analysis.87 The analysis considers not only the meaning of the word “intent” taken in isolation, but
also a second part: whether the Accused acted against the victims due to the fact that they were
members of a group “as such”; and also a third part: whether the Accused can be liable for the
intentional destruction of only a “part” of a group. Put another way, to analyze and evaluate the
mental state requirement of liability for genocide, we must examine not only the mental state of the
Accused in the perpetration of the acts, but also his mental state towards the existence of the group
“as such”, as well as the scope of the actions the Accused intended to take against that group.88
While the mental state is for committing genocide is described textually as “intent” and is
usually interpreted as “purpose”, that assertion alone is too simple. There is significant precedent
from the ICTY and ICTR that lower mental states may suffice as genocidal intent. Years ago the
Sikirica Trial Chamber stated that determining the mental state for committing genocide seemed to
be a “relatively simple issue of interpretation of the chapeaux of Article 4(2) [of the ICTY Statute,
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This author would like to propose another dimension to the mental state for the commission of genocide
on top of the two that Triffterer wrote about when he said “there are two subjective elements required to
establish criminal responsibility for genocide: the mens rea as the pendant to the actus reus and the ‘intent
to destroy.’” See Otto Triffterer, Genocide, its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group
as Such, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 400 (2001). While Triffterer’s accurately identifies two facets to the
mens rea, specifically that there can be intent to undertake an act and also intent that that act destroy,
there is also a third facet, which is the intended scope of the destruction and the interplay with “in whole
or in part.”
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See generally Schabas, William A. The International Legal Prohibition of Genocide Comes of Age.
HUM RTS. REV. 46, 49 (July-Sept. 2004) (writing on the importance and multi-faceted nature of “in whole
or in part” and its relationship to intent: “These terms appear in the introductory paragraph of Article II of
the Convention, and refer to the genocidal intent. Thus, the reference is not to the physical act, as if there
must be some quantitative threshold where mass murder turns into genocide, but rather to the intent of the
perpetrators.”).
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nearly identical to Article 4 of the Extraordinary Chambers Statute].”89 Today, however, Michael G.
Karnavas, Lead Defence Counsel in the case Prosecutor v. Prlić et al.90 and President of the ADCICTY, laments that new interpretations of the mens rea requirement for genocide consequently mean
that “genocide is an amorphous field of liability where an accused before the ad hoc Tribunals could
be convicted of genocide without possessing genocidal intent.”91 This memorandum discusses the
various interpretations of the “intent” to commit genocide below.
1. Purpose Standard (dolus specialis & specific genocidal intent)
It is obvious that the statutory “intent” in the Extraordinary Chambers Statute can speak to a
mental state of purpose.92 “Intent” and “purpose” by definition share the concept of a desired
outcome. This desired outcome to cause genocide is called specific genocidal intent, broadly
equivalent to a dolus specialis in civil law.93
Generally, genocide is considered distinct from other crimes due to the fact that it embodies
the dolus specialis. In the ICTR, the Trial Chamber has repeatedly upheld the requirement of specific
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Sikirica et al., Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit, 3 September 2001, at
para. 58.
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No. IT-02-60-T.
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See Karnavas, Michael G. Complicity In Genocide Before The International Ad Hoc Tribunals: A
Moving Target In Conflict With The Principle Of Legality. Draft for publication 27-28 (2006). [On file
with the author of this memorandum].
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Greenawalt, Alexander K. A. Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based
Interpretation. 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2259, 2268 (1999).
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See generally Van Sliedregt, Elies. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW. Doctoral Thesis, University of Leiden (2005) at 48; but see
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125 (2001) (expressing his displeasure with those terms and explaining that “It would probably be
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national systems of criminal law.”).
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genocidal intent.94 For instance, in the Akayesu Trial Judgment, the dolus specialis is described as
qualifying the key element of an intentional offence, requiring that the Accused clearly sought to
undertake the act charged or clearly intended the result: “Special intent […] is required as a
constituent element of certain offences and demands that the perpetrator have the clear intent to
cause the offence charged. According to this meaning, special intent is the key element of an
intentional offence, which offence is characterized by a psychological relationship between the
physical result and the mental state of the perpetrator.”95
Specific genocidal intent is so important that the entire theory of liability can rise or fall on
its finding, yet it is extraordinarily difficult to determine whether the Accused indeed had the
purpose to commit genocide. Compared to the actual deaths themselves in Cambodia and the
resulting mass graves, the mental state of the Accused is much more difficult to show. The
International Criminal Court suggests as persuasive authority that in a case where there is not clear
evidence of the Accused’s specific genocidal intent (there rarely is), then the “Existence of intent
and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances.”96 The Prosecution should
invoke the ICC’s Elements of Crimes and argue that the facts ad circumstances can support a
finding of the dolus specialis.
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a) Destruction of a group “as such” and the inference of purpose
The word “intent” in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention should be interpreted as it
relates to the destruction of a protected group “as such.” “As such” is the operative phrase due to
the fact that it connotes that the intent was to destroy the members of a group because they were
members of that group. Arguably, “as such” excludes liability for ancillary reasons for the group’s
destruction, such as the knowledge—but indifference—that targeting an entire population for
destruction in a province in order to eradicate the rebels there also will include destroying all the peaceful
villages of a protected group as collateral damage. In other words, “as such” arguably precludes
liability for genocide for destroying protected groups who happened to be in the wrong place at the
wrong time.
There is considerable jurisprudence on how to infer purpose to commit genocide from the
facts of a case. In the original ad hoc Tribunal case on genocide, the ICTR’s Akayesu Trial Chamber
stated that “intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible, to determine. This is the
reason why, in the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a
certain number of presumptions of fact.”97 The Trial Chamber continued to elaborate that “it is
possible to deduce the genocidal intent […] from the general context of the perpetration of other
culpable acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts were committed by
the same offender or by others.”98 The Chamber looked at factors including “the scale of atrocities
committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and
systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while
excluding the members of other groups.”99
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Kayishima & Ruzindana100, another ICTR case on genocide from 1999, is more specific and
supports the argument that specific genocidal intent can be inferred from the facts. The Judgement
of the Trial Chamber held that “[Specific genocidal] intent can be inferred either from words or
deeds and may be demonstrated by a pattern of purposeful action. In particular, the Chamber
considers evidence such as the physical targeting of the group or their property; the use of
derogatory language toward members of the targeted group; the weapons employed and the extent
of bodily injury; the methodical way of planning, the systematic manner of killing.”101 The Kayishema
& RuzindanaTrial Chamber also added that “the number of the victims from the group is also
important”102 to an inference of genocide from the facts.
Contemporaneously with Kayishima & Ruzindana, and looking to much the same factors as in
that case, the prosecution in Sikirica at the ICTY offered seven factors it believed relevant to infer
from the facts that the Accused had the purpose to destroy a group “as such”103:
(a) The general and widespread nature of the atrocities committed;
(b) The general political doctrine giving rise to the acts;
(c) The scale of the actual or attempted destruction;
(d) Methodical way of planning the killings;
(e) The systematic manner of killing and disposal of bodies;
(f) The discriminatory nature of the acts; and
(g) The discriminatory intent of the accused.
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Although the Sikirica Trial Chamber acknowledged that those factors are relevant, it drew instead
from Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention to determine the “ordinary meaning that should be
given to the phrase ‘destroy in whole or in part’ in its context and in the light of the object and
purpose of the 1948 Genocide Convention.”104 The Trial Chamber held that the ordinary meaning
of “in part” is “a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else
a significant section of a group such as its leadership.105 But like Kayishema, Sikirica does not provide
any specific number of victims required to infer intent.
The preceding cases seem to indicate that in order to infer specific genocidal intent from the
facts, the most operative fact is the existence of some sort of genocidal plan. Schabas seems to agree
with that inference-upon-inference; he wrote in his treatise GENOCIDE

IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW

that “the plan or circumstances of genocide must be known to the offender.”106 The legal historian
David Alonzo-Maizlish, a disciple of the Honourable Theodor Meron, disagrees with Schabas and
the author of this memorandum, however. Alonzo-Maizlish asserts that “It does not matter at all
whether the genocidal intent was part of a plan, perpetrated by a state or by private parties,
successful or reasonably likely to succeed, vast in scope or small in the number of victims.”107
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Alonzo-Maizlish notes that Schabas was writing his treatise before the Jelisić Appeals Judgement,
which stated that “The existence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime.”108 In
response, the author of this memorandum would like to point out that the Jelisić Appeals Chamber
effectively took the opposite position on the requirement of a plan for genocide as a practical
matter, and, in any event, upheld the importance of a plan to inferring specific genocidal intent. In
that same paragraph, the Appeals Chamber also said, “However, in the context of proving specific
intent, the existence of a plan or policy may become an important factor in most cases. The evidence may be
consistent with the existence of a plan or policy, or may even show such existence, and the existence of
a plan or policy may facilitate proof of the crime.”109
b) Specific factual evidence of specific genocidal intent in Cambodia
In accordance with the jurisprudence from the ad hoc Tribunals above, everything in regards
to proving specific genocidal intent turns on the facts in Cambodia. Applying the facts, it can be
argued that the leaders of the Khmer Rouge acted with specific genocidal intent to destroy ethnic
and racial minorities. In order to adhere to the tenet of Khmer Rouge ideology that “[all] citizens
had to be proper Khmers, as defined by the revolution,”110 the transformation of Cambodia
envisaged by the Khmer Rouge required the social, ideological, political, and racial purification of
the Cambodian nation.111
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The Khmer Rouge undertook a plan of sociological and physical destruction of groups
considered to be irremediably tainted by their association with the old social order or otherwise
incongruous with its intended new order.112 One part of the plan was the issuance of a decree
“banning” all minorities. It said, “‘There is one Kampuchean revolution. In Kampuchea there is one
nation, and one language, the Khmer language. From now on the various nationalities […] do not
exist any longer in Kampuchea.’”113 This “purification” required the extermination or forced
assimilation of all non-Khmer ethnic groups, including ethnic Vietnamese, Chinese, Cham, and Thai.
The Khmer Rouge’s view of the country’s twenty-some ethnic minorities, who together made up
more than 15% of the Cambodian population, was to deny their existence. The regime officially
proclaimed that they totalled only 1% of the population and the words of Kiernan, statistically wrote
them off.114 In some provinces, the Khmer Rouge’s decree banning all minorities was interpreted to
require pogroms and mass killings. In other places, non-Khmer people were allowed to remain in
agricultural collectives as long as they abandoned their distinctive culture and language.”115
Regarding one of the largest forced migrations to the communes, the evacuation from the Eastern
Zone and that Zone’s subsequent cleansing, Stanton wrote that “The blue scarf [handed out to each
evacuee] was the equivalent of the Nazi yellow star. It is the most dramatic proof that the genocide was
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ordered from the top by government leaders of Democratic Kampuchea.”116 In either event, there was clearly a
state plan to destroy ethnic and racial minorities and their cultures for the express reason that they
were incongruous ethnic or racial groups “as such.” That, all told, 1.6 million members of ethnic
minorities died, representing 21% of their combined 1975 population117, adds credence to the
assertions that they were purposefully subjected to a state plan over time that resulted in their
destruction and that the Extraordinary Chambers may infer the implementers’ specific genocidal
intent accordingly.
In assessing whether there was specific genocidal intent to destroy the ethnic Khmer
majority, Professor Schabas was correct when he wrote that “[it] turns on complex interpretative
issues, especially concerning the Khmer Rouge’s intent with respect to its non-minority-group
victims.”118 Perhaps the best way to show that the Khmer Rouge acted with specific genocidal intent
against the ethnic majority is to examine its actions against the Khmer nation’s own constituent subgroups. One sub-groups is “religious”: the Buddhist monks.
The Khmer Rouge’s assault on religious groups fell heavily on Buddhism. Buddhism was an
integral element of traditional Cambodian life; Buddhism in Cambodia embodied and transmitted
culture, and many Cambodians still of Buddhism as the “soul” or “core” of Khmer culture and
civilization. The Khmer Rouge were vicious in their attempts to stamp out organized religion as part
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of their plan for the new order.119 They considered the Buddhist monks to be social parasites.”120
After the Khmer Rouge took power in 1975, “Buddhism was subject[ed] to eradication in less than
twelve months.”’121 Religious observances, rituals, and practices were prohibited. The cooperative
dining hall replaced the wat as the ritual and ceremonial focus of social organization. Outside the
cities, the temples were destroyed or converted into warehouses, workshops, or stables; some
became prison-execution facilities. Buddha images and other religious artefacts, statuary, books, and
the monks’ libraries were destroyed. The Sangha leadership, the most venerated monks who were
responsible for maintaining, translating, advancing, and spreading the teachings of Buddhism, and
those who refused to disrobe or otherwise disobeyed orders were executed.122
A self-congratulatory note survives in an eight-page Pol Pot “Center” document dated
September, 1975 entitled About the Control and Application of Political Leadership in Accumulating Forces for
the National Front and Democracy of the Party. The note says: “Monks have disappeared from 90 to 95
percent. […] Monasteries […] are largely abandoned. The foundation pillars of Buddhism […] have
disintegrated. In the future they will dissolve further. The political base, the economic base, the
cultural base must be uprooted.”123 Madam Yun Yat, the Minister of Culture and Education, boasted
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to visiting Yugoslavian journalists in 1978, that Buddhism was incompatible with the goals of the
revolution; it was “‘a relic of the past, forgotten and surpassed.’”124 By the end of Khmer Rouge,
Buddhism had been completely destroyed as an organized religion and its monastic leadership
almost entirely destroyed.125 Prior to 1975, there were approximately 60,000 monks in Cambodia; by
late 1979, almost a year after the Vietnamese ousted the Khmer Rouge from the capital, fewer than
1,000 monks had survived and returned to their former monastery sites.126
Adding credence to the argument that the Khmer Rouge acted with specific genocidal intent
to destroy the Buddhist leadership for being a religious group “as such” is that Buddhist monks were
not the only religious group targeted for destruction. The Khmer Rouge were no more tolerant
towards minority religions than they were towards Buddhism. The Khmer Rouge also attacked
Muslim Cham institution. Documents regularly use the term “assimilation” to describe
euphemistically the goal of the Khmer Rouge to absorb (or else kill) the Muslim Cham and other
ethnic minorities.127 Ninety thousand Cham representing over one third of that group’s 1975
population died during their “assimilation.”128 Christianity was also abolished.129 Only one Christian
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pastor in the entire country survived, and then only by hiding his identity.130 The Khmer Rouge
Central Committee ordered the demolition of the Phnom Penh cathedral131, which was carried
out.132
Despite all of the evidence above, the Prosecution must keep in mind that there are still
barriers to liability for genocide if the Chambers use a strictly textual construction. Schabas has
written that the treatment of the Buddhist monks and the Cham Muslims fails to meet a rigorous
interpretation of Article II of the Genocide Convention due to the fact that “Destruction of
religious institutions and forced assimilation of populations are acts of cultural, not physical,
genocide.”133 In order to overcome that barrier, the Prosecution should advocate an expansive,
ensemble interpretation of the Genocide Convention looking in part to the overarching jus cogens of
international humanitarian law to include, as matters of law and policy, the cultural groups that the
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drafters specifically omitted. That position is explained in more detail in the section on arguments
for an expansive definition of the protected “group” below.
2. Knowledge Standard
Purpose is not necessarily the only mental state that satisfies genocidal “intent.” It is less
obvious that genocidal “intent” can be fulfilled when a perpetrator merely has knowledge that he is
participating in a widespread plan of destruction of a group and that the group targeted for
destruction is protected by the Genocide Convention. That interpretation of the Genocide
Convention has been advocated by scholars134, and also held by the Krstić and Kayishima & Ruzindana
cases in the ad hoc Tribunals for the crimes of aiding and abetting or complicity in genocide.
Some scholars have argued that the intent to commit genocide should not be qualified as
purpose, specific genocidal intent or dolus specialis. These scholars have argued that specific genocidal
intent in the mens rea of common law systems, corresponding to dolus specialis in the civil law systems,
would constitute a qualified form of intent that is not required—nor even mentioned—in the
international instruments defining genocide. Otto Triffterer, a professor at the University of
Salzburg and perhaps the most influential scholar among the critics of specific genocidal intent, has
commented that while “The international jurisprudence establishes quite often that the perpetrator
acted with the specific, special intent ‘to destroy’ and that he in fact was aiming at such a
destruction,” in fact the Genocide Convention and the ad hoc Tribunals’ jurisprudence “nowhere
expressly [state] that this particular intent needs an extremely strong will as an indispensable element
and, therefore, has to be denied, if this intensity on the emotional side is lacking.”135 In place of a
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purpose standard for liability for genocide, Triffterer has argued for a knowledge approach, leading
to a broader interpretation of the requisite “intent” to commit genocide. Under his interpretation, it
is sufficient that one of the constitutive or underlying acts was committed with an ordinary intent
“to destroy,” meaning that the perpetrator “accept[ed] that his act ought to or most probably might have
this additional consequence.”136 It should also be noted that Abrams’ research that “the travaux
préparatoires of the Genocide Convention regarding ‘intent’ make clear that the motive of the perpetrator is
irrelevant to whether an act constitutes genocide”137 supports Triffterer’s argument that a mental state
less than clear specific genocidal intent should suffice for the commission of genocide.
The International Law Commission, however, took a different stance from when it defined
genocide in the 1996 Code of the Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.138 In addressing the
question of the “intent” to commit genocide, it said that, “[A] general intent to commit one of the
enumerated acts combined with a general awareness of the probable consequences of such an act
with respect to the immediate victim or victims is not sufficient for the crime of genocide. The
definition of this crime requires a particular state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the

136

Otto Triffterer, Genocide, its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such, 14
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 400 (2001). (emphasis added).
137

See Abrams, Jason. The Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo: Observations on the Codification of
Genocide. 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 303, 308 (2000-2001). This memorandum should note, however, that the
travaux préparatoires are not mandatory authority, even though they are sometimes treated that way. See
generally Klabbers, Jan. International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of Travaux
Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation? N.I.L.R. 267 (2003). There is precedent for taking them only as
(highly) persuasive authority; see Krstić Trial Judgement, paras. 142, 584 (showing that “the evidence in
the Convention’s travaux préparatoires provide additional support.” [emphasis added]); see also
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgement, 22 March 2006, para. 501 (citing “the object
and purpose of the Convention as reflected in the travaux préparatoires” as one of several primary
sources for the interpretation of genocide).

138

Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law
Commission at its forty-eighth session (1996).

53

overall consequences of the prohibited act.”139 International Law Commission went back to the
wording “as such” to support its view that there must be specific genocidal intent due to the fact
that the intention must be to destroy the group “as a separate and distinct entity, and not merely
some individuals because of their membership in a particular group.”140
Most recently, however, the drafters of the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC had the
opportunity to resolve the ambiguities in the original Genocide Convention and ad hoc Tribunal
statutes. They wrote that criminal liability for genocide exists under a subtly different, yet farreaching, set of mental states than specific genocidal intent and dolus specialis: now “intent and
knowledge”141 may each suffice. Specifically, Article 30(2)(a) says that intent will be found “in
relation to conduct” where “that person means to engage in the conduct” and in Article 30(2)(b)
that “[genocide will be found] in relation to a consequence [where] that person means to cause that
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events” [emphasis added]. The new
element of awareness means that Article 30(2)(b) clearly has a knowledge standard. The
Extraordinary Chambers should recall that the Rome Statute is a highly persuasive authority and is
invoked in Article 9 of the Cambodia Special Agreement.
Applying a knowledge standard to the facts, it may be most useful to find liability for
genocide against the ethnic Chinese. The ethnic Chinese under the Khmer Rouge suffered the worst
disaster ever to befall any ethnic Chinese community in Southeast Asia. Of the 1975 population of
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430,000, only about 215,000 Chinese survived the next four years. But whereas a purpose standard
likely would suffice to find genocide against the Cham Muslims as explained above, it may not
suffice to find liability for genocide against the ethnic Chinese. Ethnic Chinese were nearly all urban,
and they were seen by the Khmer Rouge as archetypal city-dwellers, and therefore as prisoners of
war. In this case they were not targeted for execution because of their race, but like other evacuated
city-dwellers they were made to work harder and under much more deplorable conditions than rural
dwellers. The penalty for infraction of minor regulations was often death. This was systematic
discrimination based on geographic or social origin. The Chinese succumbed in particularly large
numbers to hunger and to diseases such as malaria. The 50% of them who perished is a higher
proportion than that estimated for Cambodia’s city-dwellers in general (about one-third). Further,
the Chinese language, like all foreign and minority languages, was banned.142 This memorandum
takes the position that when the ethnic Chinese were made to labour in conditions even more brutal
than those the general population faced and so severe that a disproportionately large number of the
ethnic Chinese died over four years, that at some point during that period the Khmer Rouge officials
or cadres administering the forced labour must have known about the horrendous death toll the
ethnic Chinese were incurring.
This section ends noting that some of the world’s leading defence counsel, such as Michael
Karnavas at the ICTY, are very critical of the jurisprudence supporting a knowledge standard for
liability for genocide.143 While there is not yet any case law in the ad hoc Tribunals on a knowledge
standard of liability for a principal, the Krstić Appeals Chamber held that knowledge was the
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appropriate mens rea for aiding and abetting the commission of genocide.144 That jurisprudence is, in
Karnavas’ opinion, creating ex post facto crimes and finding liability outside the black letter law of the
ad hoc Tribunals’ statutes and the Genocide Convention. Karnavas notes the Krstić Appeals Chamber
only cited two state practices, those of France and Germany, which were directly relevant to the
issue, and then cited other authority that provided no support.145 Even Schabas agrees that the
holdings on genocide in the Krstić Appeals Judgement and in Blagojević which followed it are based
on less-than-convincing legal reasoning, really judicial legislation that frames the legal analysis to fit
the desired result and hints of compromises among a divided bench.146 Nevertheless, the Krstić
Appeals Judgement still stands as powerful and recent precedent that knowledge may suffice for
certain modes of liability for genocide.
Jurisprudence on the mental state aside, there are also policy arguments that knowledge
should suffice for liability for genocide. The ICJ has explained that “The [Genocide] Convention
was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose [… Its] object on the one
hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and
endorse the most elementary principles of morality.”147 To escape liability for genocide when a
leader knows, even with indifference, that the body count is rising, that ethnic minorities are
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dropping dead in the fields, that his plan is causing extreme suffering such that that a protected
people is approaching the brink of destruction, would be a miscarriage of justice.
3. Recklessness Standard
One remaining question is whether an individual carrying out a genocidal plan must be aware
of that plan. In answer no, this memorandum advocates a recklessness theory of genocidal liability.
The nexus between “recklessness” and “intent” is at first unapparent. A recklessness
standard, however, may fit the facts of the Cambodian situation as there is new scholarship giving
rise to the theory that intentionally evacuating cities and forcing millions of urbanites onto agrarian
communes was a policy that the Khmer Rouge knew, or should have known, was likely to result
immediately in widespread starvation and death.
Two doctoral historians of modern Cambodia, Craig Etcheson and Steve Heder, have new
research that leads them to believe the Khmer Rouge forcibly put in place a plan for agriculture that
was so doomed to fail that it was likely—and foreseeable—that the plan’s implementation would
result in the very deaths and party purges that resulted. What follows is a summary of the situation
as Etcheson and Heder now understand it, in contrast to the more conventional fact pattern
espoused by historians which was laid out in the Factual Background section above:
Under the Khmer Rouge’s communistic theory, cities were seen as parasites. Cities lived off
the agricultural produce of the countryside. The rice crop, not conventional industry such as steel
production or coal mining, was seen looked upon as the true source of wealth for Cambodia.
Therefore, the Khmer Rouge sought to realign the entire country around agricultural production on
communes to usher Cambodia into a new golden age of agricultural wealth and self-reliance. The
Khmer Rouge implemented its plan by evacuating the cities and relocating or liquefying any
dissenting groups, be they ethnic minorities, religious leaders, or the socio-economic classes
incongruous with the new order. What happened next seems to have shocked the Khmer Rouge.
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Agricultural production plummeted due to the fact that the urbanites were ill-suited to tend rice
paddies, the land was overworked, and the population was exhausting itself from brutal, forced
manual labour. Starvation ensued. Purges followed as the Khmer Rouge sought out the traitors from
its own ranks it accused of having collaborated with the Vietnamese to sabotage the communes.148
In short, the Khmer Rouge intentionally implemented a plan that it should have known was
likely to result immediately in widespread starvation and death. Under that view, however, even
though there was clear a clear plan with clear intent to put agricultural communes in place, and largescale famine and deaths were very likely to occur among all protected groups performing forced
labour under that plan, the famine was not the intended to result. This raises the question about
what constitutes a genocidal plan: one in which the instigators and/or commissioners sought or
knew that the result would be the destruction of a group, or one in which they should have known the
result would be the destruction of a group but nevertheless carried on with reckless disregard for the
foreseeable and likely outcome?
The events described here make it look as if the prosecution may succeed in advocating a
recklessness standard. It seems a travesty of justice not to call it genocide when the regime killed
massive numbers of its own Khmer people and also clearly-protected ethnic, racial, and religious
groups, all in an endeavour it should have known was doomed. Yet it may not be. Regardless of the
seeming injustice to the victims, “intent” is precisely what the text of the Genocide Convention
requires. It is a stretch to call recklessness “intent” even though the plan was purposefully
implemented—most, if not all reckless acts are done purposefully. A finding of liability for reckless
genocide in the Cambodian context would hinge on the transport of the word “intent” away from
the words “to destroy” and instead apply the mental state just to the implementation of the plan
148
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itself, which happened “to destroy” members of a protected group as a side effect, completely in
ignorance of the apparent nexus between those key words. Even if historians’ continuing research
uncovers substantially more facts in support of the recklessness theory of liability for the deaths
caused by the Khmer Rouge’s agricultural plan, proceeding upon a recklessness theory of genocide
in the Extraordinary Chambers will still be a very weak legal position. There is no jurisprudence to
support a mens rea of recklessness as the proper interpretation of genocidal “intent.”149
4. Alternate modes of liability: Aiding and abetting, Complicity, Conspiracy,
and Joint Criminal Enterprise
The topic of this memorandum is the definition of genocide in the Cambodian context. As a
relevant related matter, it bears mention that there are other forms of liability for genocide than just
for perpetration as a principal. The Extraordinary Chambers Statute describes in Article 4 the
following other modes of liability for genocide in addition to actual perpetration as a principal:
The following acts shall be punishable under this Article:
 attempts to commit acts of genocide;
 conspiracy to commit acts of genocide;
 participation in acts of genocide.
While the author of this memorandum does not believe that attempts to commit genocide are a
definitional issue at stake for the Prosecution in Cambodia, this memorandum is also including
include other modes of liability, specifically, aiding and abetting in genocide, complicity to commit
acts of genocide, and joint criminal enterprise in committing genocide, of which aiding and abetting
is explicitly covered in Article 29, and each of which are subsets of the all-encompassing phrase
“participation in acts of genocide.” Note that the author recognizes that each of these separate
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modes of liability for genocide is in fact a separate crime with different possible mental states.150 This
section is meant to be an overview due to the fact that a comprehensive discussion of the different
modes of liability for genocide would encompass more than one memorandum. This section will
look at the different modes of liability for genocide only insofar as they might give rise to the
inference that there was genocide in Cambodia, and/or affect or shed light on the definition of
genocide, especially its requisite mental state.
Karnavas is one of the foremost authorities on the jurisprudence on alternative modes of
liability for genocide in the ad hoc Tribunals’ statutes as they relate to the similar, but not identical,
modes enumerated under the Extraordinary Chambers Statute.151 Karnavas asserts that in violation
of the seemingly-explicit requirement in the Genocide Convention that there be specific genocidal
intent in order to find the existence of genocide, recent jurisprudence has held otherwise. The Krstić
Appeals Judgement held that knowledge can suffice as “intent” for the mental state to aide and abet
the commission of genocide.152 Indeed, he says, under current precedent, “an accused charged with
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genocide can be convicted without the specific genocidal intent based on aiding and abetting
genocide, complicity in genocide, command responsibility, and joint criminal enterprise.”153
The first modes of liability to be addressed are aiding and abetting and complicity in
genocide. The Akayesu Trial Chamber distinguished between those two crimes: it is enough for an
accomplice to be convicted of complicity in genocide so long as the accomplice knew (or had reason
to know) that the principle offender was acting with the specific genocidal intent,154 a position akin
to a recklessness argument. But in contrast, the Trial Chamber found that for a perpetrator to aid and
abet in the commission of genocide, the perpetrator must share the genocidal intent of the
principal.155
Following the Akayesu Trial Chamber’s seminal judgement that aiding and abetting was a
mode of liability for committing genocide, other chambers also found that knowledge of the
principal perpetrator’s intent is a sufficient mens rea to find the liability of an accomplice or an aider
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and abettor for genocide. For instance, the Musema Trial Chamber156 found liability for genocide
where the perpetrator in question voluntarily aided and abetted another person in committing
genocide and knew that that person was committing genocide, even though he did not have specific
genocidal intent himself.157 Likewise, in Kayishima & Ruzindana158, the Trial Chamber took a position
that while specific genocidal intent is required for complicity in genocide, “knowledge” of the
principal’s genocidal intent is sufficient for aiding and abetting.159
Three other Chambers have gone farther. In Bagilishema160, the Trial Chamber not only held
that knowledge satisfied the mental state for liability for aiding and abetting genocide, but also held
that complicity only requires that the accused act with knowledge and not the specific genocidal
intent.161 In other words, under Bagilishema, the mens rea for all forms of liability for the crime of
genocide is simply “knowledge.” The Semanza Trial Chamber162 followed that rationale and even
went so far as to hold that there is “no material distinction” between aiding and abetting genocide
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and complicity in genocide163, arguing against Akayesu that there was no legal basis for distinguishing
aiding and abetting from complicity by requiring a higher mens rea.164 Finally, the Blagojević Trial
Chamber relied on the Krstić Appeal Judgement, which held that mere ‘knowledge’ was the
appropriate mens rea for liability for aiding and abetting in the commission.165 The Blagojević Trial
Chamber imported that lower standard of accessorial liability and applied it: Blagojević was found
guilty of complicity in genocide by aiding and abetting where only knowledge of the principal
perpetrator’s specific genocidal intent was required.166
There is one notable exception where a Trial Chamber used a purely textual approach to
require a higher mental state than knowledge for an alternate mode of liability for genocide:
Sikirica.167 The Sikirica Trial Chamber acquitted the Accused of genocide and complicity in
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genocide168, deciding that specific genocidal “intent to destroy” requires that an accomplice in
genocide also have specific genocidal intent himself.169 Giving the words of the Statute their ordinary
meaning, the Trial Chamber stated that specific genocidal intent is required for complicity in
genocide.170
In addition to the modes of liability for conspiracy and aiding and abetting, Karnavas has
also written on the application of joint criminal enterprise type III to genocide as a mode of liability,
which he calls the “dilution of genocidal intent in the ad hoc Tribunals’ jurisprudence.”171 Examining
Stakić,172 Karnavas notes that the Trial Chamber acquitted the Accused of genocide and complicity
in genocide173, and in discussing criminal liability under JCE III as it relates to genocide, the Trial
Chamber proclaimed that alternate modes of participation such as complicity, aiding and abetting,
and joint criminal enterprise, cannot replace core elements of a crime, such as specific genocidal
intent. Importing JCE III into genocide, Karnavas agrees, would result in diluting the specific
genocidal intent.174
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The Brdjanin Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed with the rationale in the Stakić Trial
Chamber and Karnavas’ view that only specific genocidal intent may suffice. In an interlocutory
appeal, the Brdjanin Appeals Chamber found that JCE III, could be imported into genocide without
a finding of the specific genocidal intent.175 Against that decision, Judge Shahabuddeen wrote an
important dissent, stating that “genocide is a crime of specific intent, a conviction for it is therefore
not possible under the third category of joint criminal enterprise. […] The requirement that the
accused be shown to have possessed a specific intent to commit genocide is an element of that
crime. The result is that the specific intent always has to be shown; if it is not shown, the case has to
be dismissed.”176 Nevertheless, the views that the Stakić Trial Chamber, Judge Shahabuddeen, and
Michael Karnavas advocate are the minority view; overall, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals
solidly supports the argument that lower mens rea than specific genocidal intent may suffice for
alternate modes of liability for the commission of genocide.
5. Mode of liability: Superior responsibility
The alternate modes of liability for genocide described above have jurisprudential standards
for the mental state that are lower than specific genocidal intent, and range down as far as
knowledge. Another potential alternate mode of liability here, superior responsibility, has
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jurisprudence suggesting that the mental state can be as low as mere negligence. As a preliminary
matter, Karnavas has pointed out that, like the mental states required for the alternate modes of
liability for genocide described above, jurisprudence shows specific genocidal intent is not necessary
for a finding of a superior’s liability for genocide by his subordinates.177
Generally, superior responsibility requires only that the commander know or have reason to
know that his subordinate is about to commit a prohibited act or had already done so and the
commander failed to take preventative measures or to punish the perpetrators.178 Applying an almost
identical rule to the Extraordinary Chambers Statute in Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, the Musema
Trial Chamber found that knowledge was sufficient for a conviction of a superior for genocide if the
superior “knew or had reason to know” that his subordinates were going to (or had in fact already)
committed acts of genocide.179
One final, very important case supporting the lowest conceivable standard for superior
responsibility for the commission of genocide is Brdjanin. Shortly after the Appeals Chamber’s
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decision on the interlocutory appeal in Brdjanin, above, the Trial Chamber acquitted the Accused of
genocide and complicity in genocide.180 Irrespective of the acquittal, however, the Trial Chamber
declared, in dicta, that a perpetrator can be convicted of genocide without specific genocidal intent
under superior responsibility.181 That statement is generally in support of the view that superior
responsibility for the commission of genocide has a low mental state for liability, that superiors may
be held accountable when they knew or should have known what their subordinates were doing.
That is a negligence standard.
D. “Group”
Cécile Aptel, a prosecutor at the ICTY, asserts that two main issues are at stake regarding the
Genocide Convention and its protected “groups”: first, their definitions, and second, whether the
list should be read stricto sensu, that is to ask or whether the Convention’s protection should be
extended to other groups.182 This memorandum will address each of those issues.
1. What kinds of groups are protected?
The clearly-enumerated groups that are protected against genocide are “national, ethnical,
racial, or religious” groups targeted “as such.” “As such” is a phrase loaded with meaning and whose
interpretation has widespread implications for liability. “As such” speaks to both the actus reus and
the mens rea. It reaffirms the importance of the identity of the group being destroyed as part of the
act of the crime, and also affirms that the perpetrator worked specifically to group for the sake of
eliminating its identity.
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Regarding the definition of the four protected groups expressly mentioned in the Genocide
Convention, and the interpretation of the key phrase, “as such,” the ad hoc Tribunals’ jurisprudence
has clearly evolved in scope and complexity. The ICTR Trial Chambers began, in the Akayesu Trial
Judgement, defining the four enumerated groups under the Genocide Convention in an “objective”
manner183, but in later cases adopted a more “subjective” definition.184
a) Objective definition of “group”
Aptel comments that under the objective definition of “group,” the group should be a social
reality. It should be stable and permanent. People, Aptel explains, are considered to be almost
irremediably and automatically members of a protected group by birth, and inheritance is the key to
transmission of membership.185
The Akayesu Trial Judgement is the embodiment of that objective view. The Akayesu Trial
Chamber considered whether the groups protected by the Genocide Convention, echoed in article 2
of the ICTR Statute, should be limited to only the four groups expressly mentioned, or whether the
Chamber should also include any group which is stable and permanent in the same way that the four
enumerated groups are. In other words, the question that arose was whether, under the Genocide
Convention, it would be possible to punish an Accused for the destruction of a group, if the group,
although stable and membership by birth, did not clearly meet the definition of any one of the four
groups expressly protected by the Genocide Convention.
In the judgement of the Akayesu Trial Chamber, it was particularly important to respect the
intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention. For this, they looked to the travaux
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préparatoires, and determined it was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent
group.186 In particular, the Akayesu Trial Chamber said:
On reading through the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide
Convention, it appears that the crime of genocide was allegedly
perceived as targeting only ‘stable’ groups, constituted in a permanent
fashion and membership of which is determined by birth, with the
exclusion of the more ‘mobile’ groups which one joins through
individual voluntary commitment, such as political and economic
groups.187
Therefore, the Akayesu Trial Chamber reasoned, a common criterion in the four types of groups
protected by the Genocide Convention is their automatic membership, by birth, “in a continuous
and often irremediable manner.”188 It held that that “ensur[ing] the protection of any stable and
permanent group” would best “respect the intention of the drafters.”189
The Akayesu Trial Chamber also looked to the Nottebohm Decision rendered by the
International Court of Justice.190 That case helped the Akayesu Trial Chamber elaborate on the
definitions of each of the four protected groups. Taking a seratim approach to the list, proceeding
one-by-one, it held that a national group is defined as “a collection of people who are perceived to
share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties.”191
An ethnic group, it held, is generally defined as “a group whose members share a common language
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or culture.”192 A racial group “is based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a
cographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors.”193 And a religious
group, the Trial Chamber held, “is one whose members share the same religion, denomination or
mode of worship.”194
Similarly showing an objective view of the definition of “group,” the Trial Chamber
Judgement in Kayishema & Ruzindana, following Akayesu, stated its definitions of each of the four
protected groups. An ethnic group, it said, is not just one whose members share a common language
and culture, but “a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self identification); or, a group
identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others).”195 A
racial group “is based on hereditary physical traits often identified with geography.” And a religious
group includes “denomination or mode of worship or a group sharing common beliefs.”196
While the Musema case generally treats that the definition of the group as subjective, not
objective, it may be noted that the Musema Trial Judgement suggests that there is some objectivity
and rigidity to the defined group. The Musema Trial Chamber agrees with the Akayasu Trial Chamber
that the Genocide Convention’s travaux préparatoires excluded “‘mobile groups’ which one joins
through individual, political commitment,” yet permitted coverage of “relatively stable and
permanent groups.”197 In this respect, and its other statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the
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Musema Trial Judgement conforms with the earlier interpretation advocating objectivity and rigidity
to the defined group. But the Musema Trial Chamber also made the perhaps the most explicit
statement against this view: “membership of a group is, in essence, a subjective rather than an
objective concept.”198
b) Subjective definition of “group”
The definition of a protected “group” is inherently subjective.199 In the subjective approach
to the definition of “group,” a group exists insofar as the members perceive themselves as a part of
that group (self-identification), or insofar as they are so perceived by the Accused.200 Some scholars
argue that despite the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention shown in the travaux
préparatoires201 to favour only stable groups largely determined by birth202, courts should take an
“ensemble” view of the protected groups203, not considering them one-by-one, but recognizing them
together as gestalt, where the concept as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and is indicative
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of the underlying policy against killings targeted against groups rather than individuals. Looking
through the ensemble view, the principles of the Genocide Convention should be construed to
transcend the text and protect other, non-enumerated groups with a fluid membership, such as
political groups or socio-economic classes.
The subjective approach was first adopted in the Rutaganda Trial Judgement. In Rutaganda,
the Trial Chamber did not completely renounce an objective approach, but favoured a combined
definition of the group. It noted that “the concepts of national, ethnical, racial and religious groups
have been researched extensively and that, at present, there are no generally and internationally
accepted precise definitions thereof”204 It seems that the Rutaganda Trial Chamber thought of each of
the protected groups is as the embodiment of concept, in other words looking top-down from the
idea of a nation, ethnicity, religion or race to their constituent members, rather looking bottom-up at
the constituents to find their common identifying trait. Indeed, the Trial Chamber said explicitly that
“for the purposes of applying the Genocide Convention, membership of a group is, in essence, a
subjective rather than an objective concept.” A group’s membership must be assessed more flexibly
than under the objective view, “in the light of a particular political, social and cultural context.”205
The newer, more subjective view of the definition of group was further discussed in the
Bagilishema Trial Judgement. The Bagilishema Trial Chamber explained that the concepts of national,
ethnical, racial, and religious groups enjoy no generally or internationally accepted definition.206
Although membership of the targeted group must be an objective feature of the society in question,
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there is also necessarily a subjective dimension; a group may not have precisely-defined boundaries,
and there may be occasions when it is difficult to give a definitive answer as to whether or not a
victim was a member of a protected group. Moreover, the perpetrators of genocide may characterise
not targeted group “as such” in ways that fully correspond the factors that determine the group’s
own self-identification, or identification by other groups in society. Due to those difficulties, and the
inherently subjective nature of the group, the Bagilishema Trial Chamber held that the perception of a
group by the perpetrators is enough to find that group’s existence: “if a victim was perceived by a
perpetrator as belonging to a protected group, the victim could be considered [to be] a member of
the protected group, for the purposes of genocide.”207
In addition to a general shift away from the objective view of the group jurisprudentially, the
Krstić Trial Chamber also rejected Akayesu’s seratim construction of the enumerated groups. The
Krstić Trial Judgement used a progressive, ensemble approach, by which the Genocide Convention’s
enumerated groups are seen “to describe a single phenomenon.”208 The Trial Chamber took the
progressive view in noting the interrelation among the seemingly-disparate terms “national,”
“ethnical,” “racial,” and “religious.” One scholar commented about the ensemble view in Krstić that
“trying to define each of the four enumerated groups was deemed not only futile but wrong, and
contrary to the goals of the Genocide Convention.”209 Indeed, the Krstić Trial Chamber rejected
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attempts to distinguish the four terms, stating that protected groups overlap and “are on occasion
synonymous.”210
2. What groups, given the facts in Cambodia, probably are protected?
The facts in the Cambodian context probably satisfy the requirement for genocide that there
was destruction of groups protected under the Genocide Convention. Regarding ethnic and/or
racial groups, the Cham, the ethnic Vietnamese, the ethnic Thai probably were protected, and also
somewhat less clearly the ethnic Chinese. Regarding religious groups, the Cham Muslims and the
Buddhist monks probably were protected. In the Cambodian context, each of those groups fared
particularly poorly under the Khmer Rouge, and almost without exception each of those groups also
is protected prima facie as “national, ethnical, racial or religious,” or even as combinations of those
labels.
The sizable Cham Muslim minority suffered particularly poorly under the Khmer Rouge’s
policy of forced “Khmerization.” “Khmerization” and the subsequent break-up of Cham families,
the ban on their language and customs, and the killing of their leaders211 speak to a perception on the
part of the Khmer Rouge that the Cham constituted a distinct and separate group to be targeted.
That is to say, the facts indicate that the Cham were looked-upon as a group by the perpetrators,
thus qualifying under the subjective definition of group according to the Bagilishema view. The fact
that they were also clearly members of a stable, religio-ethnic minority, into which the members
were born, also lends credence to the assertion that they constituted a group objectively, under the
older line of cases following Akayesu.
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Admittedly, the number of facts available to this author regarding the ethnic Thai and
Vietnamese is much more limited than for the Cham, and mostly consists of estimated death tolls.212.
Given the relative paucity of facts, a subjective view of the Vietnamese and Thai as considered
separate and distinct groups by the Khmer Rouge the may be inappropriate, and a strictly objective
view of the group may be the best way to identify the ethnic Thai and ethnic Vietnamese as
protected groups. Like the assertion for the Cham above, the fact that the ethnic Thai and ethnic
Vietnamese in Cambodia each were clearly stable, ethnic minority groups, into which the members
were born and who could not transfer their identity, also lends credence to the assertion that they
constituted groups objectively
According to Abrams, “The ethnic Chinese and Thai communities […] faced especially
harsh treatment by the regime.”213 The Chinese, however, are the least-clearly applicable to the
determination of destruction for membership in an ethnical or racial group “as such.” According to
ongoing investigation by Kiernan, the Chinese who perished in Cambodia were not necessarily
treated as an ethnic group by the Khmer Rouge, but were considered to belong to a different, moreencompassing group, that of urbanites. Thus they were not necessarily perceived subjectively as a
Chinese “group” by the Khmer Rouge, but a subset of urbanites who happened to be
disproportionately Chinese.214 This fact, if true, actually speaks as much to the lack of specific
genocidal intent by the perpetrator as to the existence of the element of a protected “group.”
Nevertheless, out of the 1975 population of 430,000, only about 215,000 Chinese survived the rule
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of the Khmer Rouge. Their death toll constituted a higher proportion of deaths than that estimated
for Cambodia’s city-dwellers in general (about 33%). Further, the Chinese language, like all foreign
and minority languages, was banned.215 Due to the fact that the Chinese, when considered
objectively, clearly are a protected ethnic and/or racial group under the Genocide Convention, and
the fact that the Khmer Rouge targeted the Chinese for especially hard labour in deplorable
conditions that directly resulted in their deaths, there is still a case to be made that the Khmer Rouge
identified the urban group subjectively as Chinese, and therefore should incur liability for their
destruction.
The argument for liability for genocide against Buddhists as a protected group is more
difficult still. First, which Buddhists? “Buddhists” must be distinguished into the following
categories: “Buddhists” (its constituent adherents), “Buddhism” (the religious concept and identity),
and “Buddhist monks” (the leadership of the constituents practicing the religion or holding its
identity).
If the Prosecution is going to argue that the millions of collective Buddhists followers in
Cambodia taken as a whole were targeted for destruction, it must show that that Buddhists are a
protected group under the Genocide Convention in this context due to the loss of their religion and
culture, not due to their physical destruction. The reason is that despite the horrendous death toll
Buddhists incurred, there is no evidence that the Khmer Rouge intended their total physical
destruction, only the elimination of one part, its leadership. This was part of a secular transformation
by force, one to which all people in Cambodia were subject on the agricultural communes, and
under which all people from all groups in Cambodia suffered to various extents. Therefore, the tack
that remains is that loss of religion and culture as an identity for a group of people, but not their
215

See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), pp. 198-199.

76

actual physical destruction, constitutes genocide. That, too, is a weak an argument. There is
precedent on the Genocide Convention that it does not protect religio-cultural identities apart from
their physical adherents.216
The remaining examination of Buddhists as a protected “group” in the Cambodian context
then is to look at the Buddhist monks. It is unclear, but still probable, is that the destruction of the
monks suffices for the genocidal requirement for destruction of as a religious group “as such” under
the Genocide Convention. The Khmer Rouge specifically assaulted religious groups to establish its
new order, and the Buddhists were no exception. Their observances, rituals, and practices were
prohibited. The monks were made to evacuate their monasteries. The Sangha leadership were
executed. And the Minister of Culture and Education boasted to visiting Yugoslavian journalists in
1978 that Buddhism was incompatible with the goals of the revolution and was “‘a relic of the past,
forgotten and surpassed.’”217 The horrendous death rate among monks, less than 2%218, also lends
credence to their subjective identification by the Khmer Rouge as a separate and distinct group
characterized by its religion. Clearly the Buddhist monks were an objectively “religious group”; they
were a self-identified, self-selected religious group, and although the monks were not born into
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monasticism the way they were born into their race or ethnicity, the majority of whom had been
born into the religion of Buddhism, whose fluidity is not truly and issue. The statements and acts
undertaken by the Khmer Rouge specifically against the Buddhist monks are also strong evidence
that the Khmer Rouge subjectively considered the monks to be a separate and distinct religious
group worthy of destruction. Therefore, there is a strong case that the monks were also considered a
religious group subjectively in the regime’s eyes.
3. What groups, given the facts in Cambodia, probably are not protected?
The Khmer Rouge members themselves who suffered politicide probably are not a group
protected by the Genocide Convention at present. Those people targeted for When the Soviets codrafted the Genocide Convention they abhorred the idea of liability for politicide; politicide would
potentially make the Soviets liable for their own extermination of tens of millions of Kulaks and
political opponents purged from the ranks of the military, each within recent history.219 According to
Stanton at the Yale Cambodia Genocide Project and Orentlicher at the International League for
Human Rights, the travaux préparatoires show that the words “as such” were included in the Genocide
Convention specifically to prevent the application of genocide to the extermination of political
groups220, which the Soviet Union’s insisted on to avoid liability for its own domestic purges.221

219

See generally LeBlanc, Lawrence J. The United Nations Genocide Convention and Political Groups:
Should the United States Propose an Amendment? 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 268 (1988) (discussing the thin
veil of “scientific grounds” upon which the Soviet representative argued against including politicide in the
definition of genocide).

220

See Kiernan, Ben. The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses, in Genocide: Conceptual and
Historical Dimensions (Andreopoulos, George J., ed, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1994), p. 202 (quoting personal correspondence with the above-named scholars). The travaux
préparatoires were, in fact, indicative of the early Cold War mindset and indicate that proposed changes
were also made to the Genocide Convention so that United States could avoid liability for its own
potential violations Native Americans and African Americans. See LeBlanc, Lawrence J. The United
Nations Genocide Convention and Political Groups: Should the United States Propose an Amendment?
13 Yale J. Int’l L. 268 (1988).

78

Simply put, at present, there has never been a finding of legal liability for genocide based on
the destruction of a political group, “as such.” In fact, there is precedent against it: the Jelisić Trial
Chamber noted that “Article 4 [based on the Genocide Convention] excludes members of political
groups. The preparatory work of the Convention demonstrates that a wish was expressed to limit
the field of application of the Convention to protecting ‘stable’ groups objectively defined and to
which individuals belong regardless of their own desires.”222 Any finding of liability for politicide will
have to arise out of an entirely new interpretation of the enumerated “groups, as such.” That new
interpretation most probably would come out of an expansive—most likely ensemble—view of the
enumerated groups, looking to overarching policy more than to fundamental similarities among
them, which the Akayesu Trial Chamber did when it held that groups required permanency. Liability
for politicide coming out of a matter of overarching policy would likely following the Extraordinary
Chambers’ explicit disregard for the plain meaning of the travaux préparatoires, and its search for the
Convention’s higher purpose: to protect mankind.
Likewise, it is unlikely that socio-economic classes could be a protected “group” at present.
In their aversion to urban and foreign influences and non-agrarian labour, the Khmer Rouge
persecuted and often executed those with higher education, such as French-speakers, and those with
specialized skills.223 The Khmer Rouge frequently killed the entire families of alleged transgressors.224
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That is evidence for a subjective finding of a group, due to the fact that the Khmer Rouge clearly
identified people for destruction based on criteria such as their access to wealth and education. A
socio-economic class as a protected group fails Akayesu’s objective test outright, however. A socioeconomic class is a very fluid concept; It is only indirectly composed of people who gained their
status by birth, insofar as inheritance of money and property perpetuates its membership.
Furthermore, there is simply no legal precedent for the inclusion of a strictly socio-economic class as
a “group” in the definition of genocide. Any finding of a protected “group” here will have to arise
out of an entirely new and very progressive interpretation of the enumerated “groups, as such” in
the Genocide Convention, reading-in protected socio-economic groups based on an expansive view
as a matter of policy.
4. Arguments for an expansive definition of the protected “group”
As a matter of policy, an expansive definition of the “group” helps the Prosecution find
greater liability among the Accused for genocide. It also upholds the overarching purpose of the
Genocide Convention, which The International Court of Justice harkened to in its advisory opinion
on the prohibition on genocide. Looking to the greater purpose of the Genocide Convention, the
ICJ advised that the prohibition on genocide is “binding on states, even without any contractual
obligation. […] The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing
purpose [… Its] object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups
and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality.”225 The author
of this memorandum goes even farther. As a matter of policy, the Genocide Convention must be
224

See Railsback, Kathryn. A Genocide Convention Action Against The Khmer Rouge: Preventing A
Resurgence Of The Killing Fields. 5 CONN. J. INT’L L. 457, 462 (1989-1990) (citing Ponchaud,
CAMBODIA: YEAR ZERO (1977) at 50).

225

Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory
Opinion), [28 May 1951] ICJ Reports 15, at 23.

80

viewed as it would be by every victimized man, woman and child, especially those whose tormenters
were never brought to justice through some fault in the law, some definitional flaw in the text—a
view that the Genocide Convention clearly is meant to protect against wholesale destruction of
peoples—however defined—and to perpetuate the linguistic, religious, cultural, ethnic, social,
economic, political, racial and national diversities that compose humanity; but also to do more than
that: to give humanity richness through diversity and to make the corpus of mankind a healthy body
whose whole is even greater than the sum of its parts. Jason Abrams said it most eloquently:
There is something uniquely criminal about abuses intended to
destroy the constituent groups of which humanity is comprised and
from which individuals derive much of their identity. If this is the
case, the very integrity of the concept of defining genocide calls for
an expanded definition of the crime—one that protects all groups
based on fundamental aspects of human identity.226
The Chambers at the ad hoc Tribunals may have already advocated that position unofficially; the
expansive, ensemble view—however silently pursued—already lay at the heart of the Krstić Trial
Chamber Judgement on genocide.227 The Prosecution need only now convince the Extraordinary
Chambers of its import.
As a matter of policy, too, the travaux préparatoires should only be relied on insofar as they
uphold the ensemble view of the list of protected groups, taking them as a whole rather than as
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separate, enumerated entities, and also uphold the overarching policy against requiring the specific
destruction of groups based on identity. To the degree that the travaux préparatoires are incongruous
with that stance, the Prosecution should note that they are not necessarily authoritative.228 They
were, in fact, indicative of the early Cold War mindset and the manipulation of the definition of
genocide in the Genocide Convention so that the United States and the Soviet Union could each
avoid liability for domestic acts they each knew were wrong regardless of the very black letter law
they were drafting. The Soviets abhorred the idea of liability for politicide; they had recently
exterminated tens of millions of Kulaks and political opponents purged from the ranks of the
military.229 As for the Americans, Schabas wrote, “cultural genocide was quite explicitly excluded
from the scope of the Genocide Convention, principally because of opposition from the United
States as a country of the New World.”230 To uphold those positions today would be to permit the
definition on Genocide to remain frozen in time, a relic of the Cold War and a travesty of justice.
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Furthermore, there is a legal argument that Extraordinary Chambers should not necessarily
adhere to the plain meaning of the travaux préparatoires. The Genocide Convention is not the sole
authority on the crime of genocide. A higher law exists. The Extraordinary Chambers should keep in
mind the hierarchy of international law when it applies the Genocide Convention: jus cogens are the
most powerful norms. They sit at the apex of the international legal system, a position that tolerates
no derivation. The jus cogens prohibition on genocide predates the Genocide Convention, and
harkens back at least to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg following World War Two,
which recognized the fundamental norm against genocide, then already in existence. The concept of
jus cogens was codified then in the Vienna Convention in 1969. Article 53 states that “A treaty is void
if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”231
Today, it is undisputed that the prohibition on genocide is a jus cogens norm.232 Although the intent of
the drafters as seen in the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention may not have been to
make politicide a part of genocide, jus cogens demands otherwise. The attempt by the Soviets to
exclude politicide from the Genocide Convention was itself illegal due to the fact that the Soviets
derogated from the object and purpose of the Convention specifically in order to contract out of the
non-derogable principle of international humanitarian law that is the prohibition on genocide.233 The
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Extraordinary Chambers should use an expansive view to construe the Convention as if politicide
were a subset of genocide.
E. “In whole or in part”
The meaning of “in whole or in part” appears deceptively simple. In fact, it is multi-faceted.
A hidden facet is the nexus between the term “in whole or in part” and the mental state of the
perpetrator. Indeed, Schabas has noted this essential relationship: “what is really germane to the
debate is whether the author of the crime intended to destroy the group ‘in whole or in part.’”234 While at first the
term only seems to speak to the physical act of destruction, as if there must be some threshold
where mass murder turns into genocide, on a deeper level it speaks to the intent of the
perpetrators.235 The threshold for crossing from mass murder to genocide is important then, but
only insofar as it reveals the intended scope of the group’s destruction by the perpetrator.
Several different approaches to the scope of the term “in part” have emerged over time.236
The earliest, which has not been taken seriously in recent years, narrowly insists that while the actual
result may only be the partial destruction of a protected group, the intent must have been to destroy
the entire group. Much more important to the Cambodian context and this memorandum is the
quantitative approach, which adds the concept of “substantial” to describe the “part” of the group
destroyed.

15, at 23; see also Schabas, William. Genocide In International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000) p. 474.
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1. Quantitative threshold for destruction
There are two general ways to interpret “in whole or in part” as a threshold for crossing
from mass murder to genocide. One such way is quantitatively, for example by counting whether the
number of dead reaches a certain minimum, or by examining the number of dead in proportion to
the size of the targeted population as a whole.
Here, it is useful to examine Table 1 and the data on deaths as a proportion of the
population. Among ethno-racial groups, over a third of the Cham237 and perhaps half of the ethnic
Thai238 populations each died. Half of the ethnic Chinese city-dwellers239, and all or nearly all ethnic
Vietnamese perished as well.240 When considering religious groups in addition to the Cham, the
1,000 out 60,000 proportion of the Buddhist Monks who survived in 1979 indicates a death rate of
over 98%.241 Which of those tolls is sufficiently high in absolute or relative numbers to constitute
quantitative destruction “in whole or in part”?
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The quantitative interpretation of “in whole or in part” was used by the ICTR in the
Bagilishema Trial Judgement.242 Bagilishema shows that the ICTR has adopted the position that
destruction “in whole or in part” means that a substantial part of the group must have faced or
incurred destruction. The Chamber agrees with the statement of the International Law Commission,
that “in whole or in part” means that “the intention must be to destroy the group as such, meaning
as a separate and distinct entity, and not merely some individuals because of their membership in a
particular group.’”243 Although the destruction sought need not be directed at every member of the
targeted group, the Chamber held that “the intention to destroy must target at least a substantial part
of the group.”244
Not only might quantitative destruction affect a substantial part of the group, which implies
that a numeric threshold could suffice, there is also ample jurisprudence from the ad hoc Tribunals
that proportionality matters for the finding destruction “in whole or in part.”245 Proportionality matters
for the definition of genocide—the Sikirica Trial Chamber at the ICTY looked at deaths
proportionally to the former population as a threshold requirement for genocide.246 That Trial
Chamber drew from Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention to determine the ordinary meaning that
should be given to “ in whole or in part” in its context and in the light of the object and purpose of
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the Genocide Convention.247 The Sikirica Trial Decision holds that the ordinary meaning of “in part”
is proportional, “a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole,”248
suggesting that relevant considerations should include both the total number of the group destroyed
and the proportion of deaths relative to the former population. Looking again at the data in Table 1,
it is difficult to imagine that any of those tolls, in absolute numbers or as proportions of the
population, could conceivably be considered too insignificant to reach the proportional threshold in
a quantitative interpretation of “in whole or in part”.
The controversial Jelisić Trial Judgement might indicate otherwise, however. The Jelisić Trial
Chamber set an arbitrarily high threshold for quantitative destruction. The Trial Chamber looked to
Kayishema & Ruzindana and started with the premise that “the intention to destroy must target at
least a substantial part of the group,”249 The Jelisić Trial Chamber maintained that the ICTR “appears
to go even further by demanding that the accused have the intention of destroying a ‘considerable’
number of individual members of a group.”250 That reasoning flies in the face of Schabas’ treatise
published just one year earlier that “Even a small number of actual victims is enough to establish the
material element.”251 Alonzo-Maizlish writed in support of Schabas and as a critic of the Jelisić Trial
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Chamber. Kayishema & Ruzindana, he wrote, “did not so ‘demand,’ but rather merely ‘opined
therefore, that ‘in part’ requires the intention to destroy a considerable number of individuals who
are part of the group.’ Moreover, the Kayishema & Ruzindana Chamber mentioned the number of
victims but did not consider it necessary to its ruling on intent.”252
Alonzo-Maizlish disagrees with the rationales that look at deaths quantitatively as a
threshold requirement for finding that there was genocide in Jelisić and Sikirica. In Alonzo-Maizlish’s
view, a strictly quantitative requirement for analyzing the “in part” requirement for genocide would
reach the perverse conclusion that the smallest, most vulnerable groups are excluded from
protection. He further argues that a quantitative test is contrary to—or at best inconsistent with—
the right of human groups to exist and the Genocide Convention’s manifest purpose. Finally, the
quantitative criterion would also hinder the determination of genocide at its earliest appearance,
because a genocide-in-the-making might be foiled, denying it the ultimate status of the crime-of-allcrimes, even if the requisite intent was there. Such a determination would be, in this author’s
opinion, foolish and contrary to all good policy. It is noteworthy that the ICC also holds a view
opposite to Jelisić and Sikirica; it omits a quantitative requirement in its Elements of Crime, which
explicitly allow for the punishment of “the initial acts in an emerging pattern”253 of genocide.
2. Qualitative threshold for destruction
A third, newer approach to the meaning of the protected group’s destruction “in whole or in
part” takes a qualitative rather than a quantitative perspective, replacing “substantial” with
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“significant.”254 Under the qualitative view, the loss of certain members of a group, especially its
leaders or religious figures, can have such a disproportionate effect on the group’s function and/or
identity, and those great losses can constitute genocide. Jurisprudence in support of that view
actually includes the same Jelisić Trial Judgement and Sikirica Trial Decision cited above for the
quantitative view.255 The very same statement from Sikirica quoted above, for instance, also supports
the argument that that the ordinary meaning of “in part” can be “a reasonably significant number,
relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group such as its leadership.”256
The Jelisić Trial Chamber’s second interpretation of the intent element analyzes “in part”
qualitatively. Under the qualitative analysis, the Trial Chamber held that destruction of the group
“in part” could be satisfied if the Accused targeted “the most representative members of the target
community,” which could include “the total leadership of a group,” including, for example, the
“political and administrative leaders, religious leaders, academics and intellectuals, business leaders
and others […] regardless of the actual numbers killed.”257 In contrast to the Jelisić Trial Chamber’s
interpretation, the Krstić Trial Chamber’s approach to the destruction of a group “in part” stands
for the principle that “in whole or in part” has a plain meaning, such that “any act committed with
the intent to destroy a part of a group, as such, constitutes an act of genocide within the meaning of
254
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the Convention”258; this allows a broader application than in the Jelisić Trial Chamber, including
understanding “in part” in terms of extermination-by-geographical location, or in terms of whether
the victims were selected according to criteria other than just “leadership.” This memorandum
interprets the Krstić Appeal Judgement as promulgating the qualitative interpretation, however. In
the Krstić Appeal Judgement, the ICTY Chamber did find genocide when it held a different
interpretation of “in part” than in the Trial Chamber, and ultimately held that destruction “in part”
simply “means seeking to destroy a distinct part of the group as opposed to an accumulation of
isolated individuals within it.” In my opinion, that “distinct part” may comprise its leadership.
Further, Krstić states that “Although the perpetrators of genocide need not seek to destroy the entire
group protected by the Convention, they must view the part of the group they wish to destroy as a
distinct entity which must be eliminated as such.”259 That statement would support an opinion that
the targeted destruction only of a group’s leadership, and not of the whole, would constitute
genocide.
In the Cambodian context, it is clear that the Khmer Rouge has eliminated groups “in whole
or in part” both with regards to the population of the group as a whole, and in certain cases also
with regards to its qualitative existence. The absolute numbers of deaths for the ethnic Thai,
Vietnamese, Chinese, and Cham are described in Table 1. Only a perverse mind could conclude that
any of those death tolls does not constitute destruction “in whole or in part.”
Additionally, as a qualitative matter, the Buddhists suffered the losses of tens of thousands
of their leaders, especially the Sangha monks260, and the Cham Muslims suffered the loss of their
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hakkem leadership as well.261 Provided that the existence of a protected “group” can be shown
among those potentially-protected groups addressed in this memorandum, this memorandum does
not anticipate any significant barriers to a finding of their destruction “in whole or in part” with
regard to the actus reus.
Recalling that there are distinction between various “Buddhists” as “groups”262 in the
sections above, this author is using the following categories, this section of the memorandum deals
with the qualitative assessment of “in whole or in part” as it pertains to the Buddhist monks and
their relationship to the Buddhist constituents and the religion Buddhism.
Certainly the monks themselves were destroyed “in whole or in part” in a quantitatively
substantial proportion: prior to 1975, there were approximately 60,000 monks in Cambodia in 1975,
and by late 1979 fewer than 1,000 had survived.
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But assessing their deaths’ impact on the

Buddhist constituents and the religion Buddhism necessitates a discussion of the targeted monks’
quality or significance as leaders of the wider group of Buddhists264. To put it another way, in order
to find liability for the destruction of the Buddhists as a whole (but not the Buddhist monks in and
of themselves), the quality of the monks as leaders comes into issue.
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Were the monks significant enough to Buddhism in Cambodia—a qualitative presence—that
their loss put the existence of Buddhism and its constituent Buddhists in jeopardy? Perhaps. The
Khmer Rouge drove Buddhist priests and monks out of monasteries, images of Buddha and other
religious artefacts, statuary, books, and libraries were destroyed, along with the Sangha leadership, the
most venerated monks who were responsible for maintaining, advancing, and spreading the
philosophy of Buddhism.265 Buddhists and Buddhism lost 98% of their monastic leadership in
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.266 One piece of evidence on the effect on Buddhism is the
Khmer Rouge’s own self-congratulatory note that “Monks have disappeared from 90 to 95 percent.
[…] Monasteries […] are largely abandoned. The foundation pillars of Buddhism […] have
disintegrated. In the future they will dissolve further.”267 It seems from that note that at least the
concept of Buddhism as a religion in Cambodia was in jeopardy following the monk’s
disappearance. It is very debatable, however, whether the destruction of Buddhism, when
considered separately from that religions former adherents physically, can qualify as a type of
destruction “in whole or in part.” To do so would be to take a top-down approach, meaning a
finding of liability for the destruction of that unifying characteristic that binds the group’s
constituents. Due to the fact that jurisprudence up to now has focused on the destruction of the
constituents themselves—not the religion, “as such”—it is a novel but ultimately weak legal
argument.
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3. Geographic approach to destruction
A fourth interpretation of “in whole or in part” is the newest of all. It focuses on the groups
in a geographic sense.268 Under the geographic approach, it is enough to qualify for destruction “in
part” that the perpetrator intended to destroy all of a protected group’s members in a certain region,
irrespective of his indifference towards the continued existence of the group elsewhere. An example
is the clear liability of Hitler for genocide against the Jews of Europe even though arguably he was
indifferent to (or at least incapable of destroying) Jews living in other parts of the world.
In this author’s opinion, the most important interpretation of destruction “in whole or in
part” to the Cambodian context are the quantitative and qualitative approaches discussed above.
However, since the Khmer Rouge conducted at least one large campaign in the Eastern Zone, this
author believes that a geographic construction of “in whole or in part” is a possible avenue for the
Prosecution to find liability for genocide. This section will discuss those acts and advocate the
geographic approach as a new but viable interpretation of destruction “in whole or in part.”
In the Eastern Campaign, one of the most massive killings committed was against people in
the Eastern Zone along the Vietnamese border. The UN Secretary General later wrote that “The
purge [of “enemies” within the Party] led to the largest of several local insurrections during the
regime. […] The battle [in the Eastern Zone] was characterized by major human rights abuses by
government forces, who may have killed at least 100,000 people in the region, many of them local
civilians.”269 From the provinces of Svay Rieng, Prey Veng and parts of Kandal and Kompong Cham
most people were evacuated to other provinces and placed in communes, underfed and overworked
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to death.270 When the Eastern Zone was evacuated, every person was given and required to wear a
blue and white checked scarf by Khmer Rouge cadres from Phnom Penh who were acting on direct
orders from the Communist Party Central Committee.271
Part of the problem with the application of “in whole or in part” here is the nature of the
group. The purge of the Eastern Zone ostensibly was fought against rebels there.272 The context for
the campaign in the Eastern Zone then was politicide, for which liability would necessitate first
defining political groups as protected “groups” under the Genocide Convention, and then looking
to see whether their geographic elimination was suitable for destruction “in part.” If that novel
argument fails, it would mean that the victims in the Eastern Zone would need to have been singled
out because they were Khmer, which is unlikely to have been the case.273 On the other hand, there
might be liability for genocide under a geographical construction of destruction “in part” if
subsequent facts show that the victims were members of an Eastern Zone “part” of the Khmer
national group. One such argument is that the collateral casualties of approximately 100,000 civilians
whom the Khmer Rouge leaders summarily declared to have “Khmer bodies, but Vietnamese
heads.”274 Until more evidence is found, however, the legal case for genocide in the Eastern Zone is
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not as strong as the case is for the genocide against clearly “national, ethnical, racial or religious
group[s]” such as the Chinese or Cham Muslims, discussed above.
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IV. EX POST FACTO ISSUES WITH THE CHANGING DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE
Finally, a brief but important matter is whether there are ex post facto barriers to the
Chambers arising from the application of a contemporary definition of genocide to the situation in
Cambodia from 1975-1979 instead of applying a definition of genocide that more clearly existed in
that period.275 A general principle of international law is that the Prosecution must overcome is that
a Chamber cannot apply a purely contemporary definition to the proceedings, which would be a
violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws.276
There are several sub-questions to answer. The first question is whether genocide was a
crime in Cambodia during the period 1975-1979. Arguably, it was not. Genocide was not included
explicitly in Cambodian law domestically. It is not clearly a crime in the Cambodia Penal Code of
1956,277 which was in force up until the time the Khmer Rouge came to power. The most-fitting
crimes relative to genocide in the Cambodia Penal Code of 1956 are enumerated in Articles 501,
503, and 506, which provide for “homicide,” “homicide without murderous intent,” and “homicide
with murderous intent,” respectively.278
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The second question is whether the crime of genocide was imposed on Cambodia by
international law, even if not by domestic law. There are arguments it was imposed by from
international law via the Genocide Convention. Cambodia had ratified the Genocide Convention in
1950.279 But while Cambodia is neither a dualist state nor a monist state regarding enacting domestic
laws to uphold its ratified treaties280, Article 31 of the Cambodian Constitution says generally that
“Cambodia shall recognize and respect international human rights as stipulated in the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the covenants and conventions related to
human rights, women’s and children’s rights.”281 Due to the fact that the Cambodian Constitution
does not clarify how international law is to be treated relative to Cambodian domestic law or
whether “recognize and respect” means that treaty obligations actually must be observed and
obeyed, it is unclear from a purely textual standpoint whether there was a crime of genocide in
Cambodia from 1975-1979.282
Article 503: “When the homicide results from acts accomplished or undertaken
voluntarily, with the aim of causing injury, but without the intention to kill, it shall be
characterized as homicide without murderous intent. A person found guilty of this felony
shall incur the second-degree criminal penalty.”
Article 506: “When homicide results, or may result from acts committed or attempted
voluntarily, with premeditated [sic] intention to cause death, it shall be characterized as
murder or attemted [sic] murder. A person found guilty of this felony shall incur the
third-degree criminal penalty.”
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Should the Extraordinary Chambers find the existence of the crime of genocide in Cambodia in this
period, the perpetrator will still be liable for his crime regardless of the time that has elapsed—the 2006
Cambodia Draft Code of Criminal Procedure says in Article L.121-7 that “A crime against humanity and
genocide, and war crime has no statute of limitations.”
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Jurisprudence on genocide and war crimes, however, holds that those issues may be
overcome. The Delalić Appeal Chamber noted that international humanitarian law may descend
upon armed conflicts as a matter of upholding customary international law.283 The Genocide
Convention subsumed in the Extraordinary Chambers Statute specifically states in Article I that
genocide is a crime, reflecting inviolable and non-derogable jus cogens.284 Author Michael Karnavas
asserts that in order to uphold those fundamental principles of international law, the ad hoc Tribunals
have already set precedent for stretching the definition of genocide beyond the limits intended by
the drafters of the Genocide Convention or the extent envisioned by the United Nations285 and that
expansive readings are so prevalent that “only one Trial Chamber has truly acknowledged the unique
nature of the crime of genocide in its judgement.”286
In order to uphold those fundamental principles of international law, the ad hoc Tribunals
have already set precedent for expanding the definition of war crimes and genocide in the cases
Krstić, and Blagojević.287 The holdings on liability for genocide in Krstić288 do not seem to be based on
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customary international law arising from the widespread practice of states, but instead is based on a
judicial policy followed sub silentio.289 The Krstić Trial Judgement used the progressive ensemble
approach to consider the Genocide Convention’s enumerated groups as describing “a single
phenomenon,”290 arguably against the black letter law of the Genocide Convention. The Krstić
Appeal Judgement, and the Blagojević Trial Judgement291 following it, went even further in re-defining
the law to support the conviction. They advocated two possible mental states for a finding of
liability for complicity in genocide—special intent and knowledge—which arguably do not comport
with the plain language of the Genocide Convention.292 Thus, the jurisprudence for cases on
genocide in the ad hoc Tribunal demonstrates that in circumstances where the Chambers are faced
with crimes of the highest magnitude and dubious accountability, they may as a matter of policy go
beyond ex post facto prohibitions and apply new and non-textual definitions of genocide in the
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interests of justice.293 For that reason, it is possible that the Extraordinary Chambers may cite the
ICTY to find liability for genocide in the Cambodian context, even if the facts do not fit a strictlytextual interpretation of the Genocide Convention.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is the Genocide Convention, more than any other document, that must support a finding
of genocide in the Extraordinary Chambers. Article 2 of that Convention is the lynchpin that binds
the Extraordinary Chambers Statute and the ad hoc Tribunals’ statutes; it is key that makes their
jurisprudence highly persuasive. The Tribunals’ jurisprudence shows that every word in Article 2 of
the Genocide Convention must be scrutinized. Seemingly clear terms and phrases are actually multifaceted and affect one another. Particularly at issue are the phrases “intent” “group,” “as such,” and
“in whole or in part.”
The ad hoc Tribunals establishes that “intent” to destroy does not necessitate that there be
specific genocidal intent, whether considered a common law mens rea of “purpose” or civil law dolus
specialis. Instead, the perpetrator can be liable for genocide based on his acts undertaken with
“knowledge,” especially knowledge that he is participating in a broader genocidal plan. That
“knowledge” interpretation of “intent” is the current standard for various alternate modes of
accomplice liability. A “recklessness” standard, however, probably pushes the meaning of the word
“intent” too far.
The ad hoc Tribunals also have establishes that the definition of genocide protects not only
the clearly-enumerated “national, ethnical, racial or religious group[s],” but also can protect groups
whose membership is not fluid. That rationale is based on a new subjective interpretation of the
enumerated terms and a progressive approach to the drafters’ intent. Taken as a whole, or in
ensemble, the enumerated groups are not just demonstrative of objective concepts like stability and
membership-by-birth, but instead may arguably include political groups. This is indicative of the
drafters’ fundamental intent to move towards accountability for war crimes. Consequently, the
groups that most probably satisfy the genocidal requirement for destruction “as such” include the
Cham Muslims, the ethnic Vietnamese, and ethnic Thai. The ethnic Chinese, and the Buddhists are
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less-clearly protected, and a finding of liability for their destruction will may require proving that the
Chinese were targeted as Chinese, not as urbanites, and that the Buddhists are composed of
constituent groups out of which liability exists most probably for the destruction of the monks. The
groups that less probably satisfy the genocidal requirement for destruction “as such” include the
educated and French-speaking socio-economic classes and political prisoners taken from among the
Khmer Rouge, against each of which there is little or no precedent for a finding of genocide. The
level of destruction incurred by a protected group in order to satisfy the requirement that it was in
fact destroyed “in whole or in part” may be viewed as a certain quantitative (numeric or
proportional) threshold, and also may be viewed as a qualitative threshold that is reached by the
elimination of a group’s leadership or other important members.
That there are apparent ex post facto barriers to the applicability of the contemporary
definition of genocide is probably not a real barrier to the prosecution. Although the events that
took place from 1975-1979 occurred at a time long before the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals
and their new interpretations of the Genocide Convention, The Extraordinary Chambers
nevertheless might find liability based on policy reasons. Scholarly criticism aside, as a practical
matter there is ample precedent at the ICTY for a finding of genocide when the facts do not clearly
fit the text of the Genocide Convention. The ad hoc Tribunals have set a precedent that policies may
trump treaties.
To show the existence of genocide in the Cambodian context, the Prosecution should
consider advocating an expansive, largely policy-based interpretation of the definition of genocide,
arguing that purpose, knowledge and recklessness may each fulfil the mental state requirement for
genocidal “intent”, that the protected “group” is inherently subjective and should be construed
under the ensemble view, and that the group’s destruction “in whole or in part” should be assessed
qualitatively. Genocide in Cambodia will be to be difficult to show; for the facts to satisfy every
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definitional aspect, the Extraordinary Chambers will have to go beyond the clear but short-sighted
interpretation of purpose as the only mental state described by “intent” and arrive at a finding of
knowledge or recklessness as sufficient. To find liability for genocide against every group discussed
herein, the Extraordinary Chamber will have to adopt a new, expansive understanding of who can
constitute a “group” enumerated in the Genocide Convention. Furthermore, “as such” speaks not
just to the existence of a “group”, but to the mental state whence that “group” is violated,
reaffirming that the “group” has been attacked for the sake of its very existence. Finally, the matter of
the threshold for the destruction of a “group” “in whole or in part” must be addressed numerically,
proportionally, and quantitatively. It must also address the relationship between that phrase and the
mental state, i.e., whether “intent” only to destroy “part” of a protected “group”—and no more—
may constitute genocide. To overcome those obstacles, the Prosecution should argue on historical
grounds that the travaux préparatoires should be interpreted beyond their black-letter text. Instead, the
travaux préparatoires should be construed in light of the ultimate, fundamental intent of the Genocide
Convention, which codified the jus cogens against genocide as an overarching peremptory norm of
international law that stands above all other documents and instruments and seeks to preserve that
most basic human right of any people: the right to exist.
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